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Judith Lerner***
INTRODUCTION
Mental illness, a concept accepted by many without serious
question, is a term of such ambiguity that its application to a par-
ticular individual is inherently subjective. When such a vague
concept forms the basis for involuntary commitment, there are
serious due process problems.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the inherently
subjective nature of the label "mental illness" and the failure of
psychiatry to validate that label through utilization of the scien-
tific method. Involuntary commitment based on psychiatry and
the labels which it applies must be viewed as dependent on a
defective rationale. This article will focus specifically on the
statutory provisions for emergency mental hospitalization. The
emergency provisions point with particular clarity to the dangers
and weaknesses of the concept of mental illness. The peculiar na-
ture of the emergency statutes resides in their imposition of
varying periods of temporary incarceration on the basis of an
alleged medical emergency without normal procedural safeguards.
Forms of treatment and methods of diagnosis which occur during
emergency commitment may prevent a fair hearing later as to
long-term commitment and may work to fulfill their own predic-
tion of mental illness.
It is also our goal in presenting this material to provide the
practicing attorney with some rudimentary arguments for use at
sanity hearings in the cross-examination of expert state witnesses
recommending commitment. We hope to give a sufficient idea of
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the difficulty which psychology and psychiatry are having in de-
fining "mental illness" to indicate some areas for the productive
use of critical cross-examination and/or the presentation of ad-
versary defense witnesses. A number of practitioners in psychi-
atry and psychology openly acknowledge the disarray of their dis-
ciplines and actively oppose the involuntary imposition of any
psychotherapeutic treatment modalities.' In addition, there are
undoubtedly others who are aware of these difficulties, although
they may not be public campaigners against involuntary mental
hospitalization or may even believe that involuntary commitment
is justified in some circumstances. The appearance of such wit-
nesses on behalf of the defense can raise factual questions concern-
ing the very notion of mental illness itself, and certainly concerning
its application in a given context.
We hope more generally to introduce attorneys and other
readers to the situation and consequences faced by the person
accused of mental illness in an effort to interest more trial law-
yers, and the legal profession generally, in this field. An ap-
parently fashionable response to the question of legal advocacy in
the commitment area is to treat the matter as a question of fact best
decided by medical experts, while the consequences of commit-
ment are justified as therapeutic.2 In this article, on the other
1. See letter of fourteen psychiatric residents expressing their opposition to
involuntary mental hospitalization. THE RADICAL THERAPIST (now ROUGH
TIMES), P.O. Box 89, West Somerville, Massachusetts 02144, Dec. 1971, at 22;
Platform Statement of the American Association for the Abolition of Involun-
tary Mental Hospitalization, 301 Sedgwick Drive, Syracuse, New York 13203.
Perhaps the best criticism of psychiatric theory on scientific-methodological
grounds is found in T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). More
sociologically oriented but equally impressive is T. SZAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF
MADNESS (1970). In each of these works, Dr. Szasz presents critical formulations
of current psychiatric theory and practice which are comprehensive, well reasoned
and heavily documented.
Dr. Thomas Scheff gives his own formulation of the inadequacies of cur-
rent psychological theories of mental illness and presents a sociological re-
formulation. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 55 (1966). A number of
criticisms are summarized in A. Roaow, THE PSYCHIATRISTS, 21-30 (1970).
2. We do not deal at length herein with the root question of whether
lawyers have a legitimate role in commitment proceedings, but restrict our-
selves to a consideration of the form that role should take. The consequences
of commitment alone would seem sufficient to indicate a position of active
advocacy as the appropriate role of the defense attorney in commitment pro-
ceedings. A three-judge federal court has recently gone far toward recognition
of this reality. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
For a discussion of the respective positions of the medical and legal professions
in this regard see Wenger and Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Ad-
missions to a State Mental Hospital, 10 J. HEALTH & Soc. PROB. 66 (1969).
For the personal statement of one lawyer's position see Matonis, The Rights of
Mental Patients, NATIONAL HEALTH FEDERATION BULLETIN, July-Aug. 1970, at
4. A number of ex-mental patient associations express themselves on this and
related issues in ROUGH TIMES (formerly THE RADICAL THERAPIST), Nov. 1972.
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hand, we present materials indicating that the questions involved
are not legitimately medical, and that even if they were, con-
temporary practitioners of psychiatry and psychology are not
qualified to answer them authoritatively. In the absence of a
genuinely scientific or objective standard of "mental illness," we
urge the abolition of involuntary incarceration which is grounded
in that label and in particular of the practice of emergency
commitment, which authorizes detention on the authority of med-
ical judgment alone, without judicial safeguards or a hearing of
any kind. The practicalities of the situation may not permit the
abolition of this practice in the immediate future; however, suf-
ficient factual ambiguities are presented by the concept of men-
tal illness to warrant adversary defense against commitment ac-
tions as a matter of course. Only such active involvement on the
part of the legal profession can secure adequate attention to the
difficult questions involved in the commitment process. We em-
phasize the emergency statutes herein as a paradigm of reliance
on the concept of "mental illness" and the consequences which
flow from such reliance.
PSYCHIATRY AS NONSCIENCE
The popular assumption that psychiatry qualifies'as a med-
ical science is open to serious question. A number of individ-
uals possessing psychiatric and social science credentials and ex-
perience have raised very basic questions, not only about the
adequacy of particular psychiatric theories of mental illness,
but also about the very proposition that any of the psychiatric
theories currently popular among practitioners qualifies as sci-
ence at all. As the question involved is one of science and logic,
the criteria of its evaluation are qualitative, not quantitative;
which is to say, critics of psychiatry who base their attack on
scientific grounds must be judged by their methods and argu-
ments rather than by their number.4
The Importance of Experimental Method in
Scientific Theory and Research
It is essential to the nature of science that its practitioners
utilize experimental methods in the formulation and testing of
3. T. SZAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 1, 1-96.
4. In attempting to determine whether psychiatry can qualify as a viable
science, it would be self-defeating to rely on the authority of psychiatric ex-
perts since it is this very expert authority which we question. Rather, we rely
for our evaluations of contemporary psychiatry and psychology upon a rational
analysis of the methods of psychiatry and the arguments of psychiatrists.
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hypotheses or theories of predictive value. The formulation of
concepts which can be experimentally tested is an essential element
of science, for an evaluation of a given researcher's results de-
pends on having independent researchers check their validity in
similar or identical circumstances. Terms or concepts which are
too vague to be communicated precisely result in theories which
are too vague to be either tested or disproven.5
Much of the contemporary psychiatric and psychological
theory is not subject to empirical validation. The basic tenets
of psychiatric theory, such as the concept of mental illness itself,
are so loosely defined that the same phenomenon may be per-
ceived differently by independent researchers, and the same re-
searcher may even describe the same phenomenon differently dur-
ing different experiments. Thus, for example, experiments per-
formed with a number of clinicians found that those tested did
no better than "chance" in identifying which of a certain set of
stories were written by men and which by women; which of a
battery of clinical test results were the products of homosexuals
and which were the products of heterosexuals; and which, of
a battery of clinical test results and interviews, were products of
psychotics, neurotics, psychosamatics, or normals.6
Dr. Naomi Weisstein summarizes the significance of these
experiments:
[S]exuality is of fundamental importance in the deep dy-
namic of personality; if what is considered gross sexual de-
viance cannot be caught, then what are psychologists talk-
ing about when they, for example, claim that at the basis of
paranoid psychosis is "latent homosexual panic." They can't
even identify what homosexual anything is, let alone "latent
homosexual panic." More frightening, expert clinicians can-
not be consistent on what category to assign a person, again on
the basis of both tests and interviews; a number of normals
in [one of the studies] were described as psychotic, in such
categories as "schizophrenic with homosexual tendencies"
or "schizoid character with depressive trends." But perhaps
most disheartening, when the judges were asked to rejudge
the test protocols some weeks later, their diagnoses of the
same subjects on the basis of the same protocol differed
markedly from their initial judgment. It is obvious that
even simple descriptive conventions in clinical psychology
cannot be consistently applied; that these descriptive con-
5. For a discussion of the nature of scientific method from this point of
view see POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1962).
6. See Weisstein, Kinder, Kiiche, Kirche, in GoiNo CRAZY 233-38 (H. Ruiten-
beck ed. 1972), and sources cited therein.
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ventions have any explanatory significance is therefore, of
course, out of the question.7
This unreliability of psychiatric theory is not due to a pau-
city of research. For example, there have been at least five thou-
sand papers reporting on schizophrenia in the five decades since
1920.8 There is some indication that the results of this massive
research output have been negligible.' Not only have systematic
studies failed to produce significant findings with respect to
causation, but a number of theorists have even expressed the be-
lief that "the problem itself has not been formulated correctly."'10
Unreliable results in the application of psychiatric theory
necessarily follow from the conceptual ambiguity of much of the
most basic diagnostic terminology. Thus, it has been pointed
out that,
[o]ne need only glance at the diagnostic manual of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association to learn what an elastic concept
mental illness is . . . . [T]he definition of mental illness is
left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of
adjustment that he employs. Usually the phrase "mental
illness" effectively masks the actual norms being applied.
And, because of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities
in which the American Psychiatric Association describes
its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician has the ability to
shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person
he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there.' 1
This conceptual ambiguity, which goes to the very roots of con-
temporary psychiatry, arises from the ways in which the discipline
is conceived and practiced. Such conceptual ambiguity is in-
herent in the current set of assumptions which comprise the con-
ceptual framework of psychiatry and therefore could not be elim-
7. Id. at 238. Perhaps it should be noted that this result could be ex-
plained by hypothesizing that they were misapplied prior to the experiment, as
an alternative to the proposition that they are inherently vague. But for what-
ever reason, "at any given point in time, psychiatrists find a substantial propor-
tion of persons in normal populations to be 'mentally ill.'" T. Scheff, Screening
Mental Patients, in DEVIANcE: THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE 172, 183 (Ru-
bington & Weinberg ed. 1968) citing PLuNxEr & GORDON, EPmEMOLOGY AND
MENTAL ILLNESS Part 11 (1961).
8. T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 7.
9. S. ARIETI, INTERPRETATIONS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 9 (1955) and D. JACKSON,
THE ETIOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 3-4 (1960) cited in T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at
8.
10. T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 9. See also Apter, Our Growing Restless-
ness with Problems of Chronic Schizophrenia, in CHRONIC SCHIZOPHRENIA (L.
Appleby, et al., ed. 1960).
11. Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Com-
mitment, 117 U. PA. L. RBv. 75, 80 (1968).
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inated by more detailed formulation or testing.12 Dr. Szasz, a psy-
chiatrist and teacher, formulates the problem this way:
Psychiatry is said to be a medical specialty concerned with
the study and treatment of mental illness. Similarly, astrology
was the study of the influence of planetary movements
and positions on human behavior and destiny. These are
typical instances of defining a science by specifying the sub-
ject matter of study. These definitions completely disre-
gard method and are based instead on false substantives.13
Nearly everyone has had the experience of reading the daily
newspaper horoscope to find, at first glance, a remarkable depth
of "meaning" in it. Over time and with further reflection, it be-
comes apparent that the applicability of these "predictions" is
based in large measure upon their formulation in terms vague
enough to apply to a wide variety of situations which have noth-
ing of significance in common. In other words, the newspaper
horoscope is formulated with such generality that it is scarcely
capable of disproof by application to a particular fact situation. A
reading of the critical literature suggests that the problem of con-
temporary psychiatric terminology is similar.
Formulation of the problem in terms of inadequacy of
method provides a perspective essential to an understanding of
the inadequacies of contemporary psychology and psychiatry.
Without this understanding one may be led to believe that a
greater degree of care in experimentation or a sharper formu-
lation of terms already in use could lead to a satisfactory resolu-
tion of present difficulties. However, as Dr. Thomas Szasz points
out, psychiatrists are not bound by publicly disclosed methods of
observation and inference, 14 and in partial consequence, they
have constructed a wide range of theories which are not intersub-
jectively testable or even, according to the experiments outlined
above, communicable.' 5 Moreover, each of many conflicting
12. For an introduction to some consideration of scientific development
and the place of conceptual frameworks in science see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF Scinrimic REVOLUTIONS (1962).
13. T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 1, at 1 (1961). See
also T. Szasz, Psychoanalysis as Method and as Theory, 27 PSYCHOANALYT. QUART.
89 (1958) and T. Szasz, The Classification of "Mental Illness": A Situational
Analysis of Psychiatric Operations, 33 PSYCHAT. QUART. 77 (1959), cited in T.
SZASZ, supra note 1, at 1.
14. T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 1, at 1.
15. Intersubjective testability is the quality of being capable of observa-
tion and description by more than one individual. For example, the "chemis-
try sets" which were popular some years back featured a wide range of chemi-
cals, some rudimentary apparatus, and an instruction booklet which anyone
could follow to produce desired "experimental" results. Similarly, using the
booklet one could telephone a friend who had similar materials at hand and
describe an experiment which the friend could then perform from the verbal
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theories'" now has its own adherents among the members of the
particular "school" it represents within the discipline. 17  The ri-
valries of these contending factions make the construction of a
truly scientific psychiatric theory a complicated political as well
as rational-scientific enterprise. This is a task not likely to be
completed for decades, if indeed its roots can catch hold at all in
the loose soil of what is now psychiatric theory.
Conceptualization and Application of Psychiatric Labels
The failure to institutionalize the scientific method in psy-
chiatry has permitted various subjective factors to form the bases
for the conceptualization and application of psychiatric termi-
nology. These subjective factors, as opposed to scientific test-
ing, have been responsible for the redefinition of various forms
of behavior as "mental illness." One example of this redefinition
of behavior is illustrated by Dr. Szasz in reviewing the contribution
of Charcot, a French physician.' Dr. Szasz indicates that Char-
cot was able to use his reputation as an expert neurologist to
achieve a redefinition of what had previously been called "ma-
lingering," or "faking it," as "hysteria," which is considered to
be a genuine disease by the psychiatric profession. Dr. Szasz does
not deny that malingering/hysteria may correlate with or result
from a physical-chemical disorder. He simply points out that the
change in conceptualization was due to the social status of the dis-
coverer rather than such scientific factors as a methodological
or technological advance.
The process utilized by Charcot in redefining malingering
involves the labelling of certain types of behavior as "functional
description with predictable results if the instructions were followed properly.
By contrast, no psychiatric "instruction book" or even prolonged course of study
has- been shown to enable separate practitioners to achieve consistent or pre-
dictable results. Individual clinicians have even been shown to be inconsistent
in formulating diagnoses from the same phenomena. See note 10 supra and
accompanying text. It may be that the failures of method and inadequacies
of conceptualization indicated herein provide a partial explanation for the
contention that "We do not yet know what about psychotherapy is ...teach-
able." Werry, Psychotherapy-A Medical Procedure?, in GOINO CRAZY, supra
note 6, at 172.
16. A few theories, like behaviorism, have achieved a reputation for greater
predictive ability, but appear to achieve this result through oversimplification.
For example, compare B. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDoM AND DIGNITY (1971) with
BERTALANFFY, ROBOTS, MEN AND MINDS (1967), or R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS
OF EXPERIENCE (1967). Bertalanffy presents the criticism of a biologist. Dr.
Laing presents a less apparently systematic, but nevertheless compelling, cri-
tique of behaviorism in the context of constructing the foundations of an al-
ternative theory which might account for experience as well as behavior.
17. For a discussion of how the values of individual psychiatrists enter into
the development of psychiatric theory see A. RoGow, THE PSYCIATRISTS (1970).
18. T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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illness"-illness with no known explanation in physicochemical
or ordinary medical terms. In determining what is a "functional
illness," however, a nonscientific subjective decison is necessarily
made. This is a social rather than a medical or scientific deci-
sion.' 9 This social decision is based on a subjective determination
of how a person should act or what is "normal" behavior. Men-
tal illness or insanity, then, is at least arguably a label the appli-
cation of which will vary from culture to culture depending on
what is considered "normal." In apparent agreement with this
view another physician, Dr. Joseph Berke, contends that insanity is
synonymous with behavior that is unacceptable within a given
cultural framework.2" In addition, the application of "mental
illness" may be influenced by social and political factors oper-
ating within the cultural framework. Thus, Dr. David Cooper, a
British psychiatrist, postulates that social and political factors in
a particular culture may be influential in the diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia. 21  Given the existence of such intangible and vari-
able influences, the fallability of psychiatric diagnosis and label-
ling becomes apparent.
An Illustration: Sexism in Psychiatry
In view of the role played by subjective factors and the vague-
ness of psychiatric labels, it is not surprising that diagnoses of
mental illness may often focus on various subgroups and minor-
ity groups which are under-represented in the psychiatric pro-
fession. Thus, behavior which may not be abnormal within a
particular minority group may be considered abnormal by
the majority of psychiatrists. Some psychiatrists, for example,
believe that all "hippies" are mentally ill, while others disagree.22
Many psychiatrists believe that certain forms of sexual activity,
such as prostitution and the use of prostitutes, and masturba-
tion, are symptoms of mental illness.23  Being poor and un-
19. RECENT SOCIOLOGY No. 3: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH viii
(Dreitzel ed. 1971).
20. Rossabi, Anti-Psychiatry: An Interview with Dr. Joseph Berke, in R.D.
LAING AND ANTI-PSYCHIATRY 273, 274 (Boyers and Orrill eds. 1971). For
further references on the difficulty of specifically defining mental illness see
sources cited in Elliott, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis
of Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 231, 232, n. 8 (1970).
21. D. COOPER, PSYCHIATRY AND ANTI-PsYCHIATRY 2-3 (1967). See gen-
erally R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF (1965). For the statement of an attorney
see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1131, n.102
(1972).
22. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 103
n.8 (1971).
23. MENNINGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF
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wanted predisposes a person to being cast in the role of mental pa-
tient,"4 and the unhappiness of many elderly persons is often
treated as an illness. 25
Perhaps the role of subjective bias in the formulation and
application of psychiatric labels is most explicit with regard to
women.2 0 This area is considered in some detail because it
serves to illustrate the nature and extent of the larger problem.
Many of the major figures in the literature of psychology
exhibit a large degree of sexual bias. Sigmund Freud, the founder
of psychoanalysis, believed that a woman's desire for an intel-
lectual career should be attributed to penis envy. Thus, Freud
wrote:
The desire after all to obtain the penis for which she so longs
may even contribute to the motives that impel a grown-up
woman to come to analysis; and what she . . . expects to
get from analysis, such as the capacity to pursue an intellec-
tual career, can often be recognized as a sublimated modifi-
cation of this repressed wish.27
Carl Jung, another eminent psychological theoretician, felt that
no one can evade the fact, that in taking up a masculine call-
ing, studying, and working in a man's way, a woman is do-
ing something not wholly in agreement with, if not directly
injurious to, her feminine nature.28
Joseph Rheingold, a contemporary theoretician, reiterates the no-
tion of biological determinism as scientific fact:
THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES 6 (1964). See also T. SZASZ,
THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 180-206, and Coleman, Sur-
viving Psychotherapy, THE RADICAL THERAPIST, Sept. 1971, at 11-12.
24. See, e.g., T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at xxiv
and HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY at 110-12 (1971).
25. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY at 112-14 (1971).
26. The best source presently available on this subject is P. CHESLER,
WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972). The prevalence of sexism in psychiatric diag-
nosis and treatment is so apparent that arguments concerning a denial of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment may be in order in every case of
actual or prospective involuntary hospitalization of a woman on the basis of
psychiatric authority. This thesis has been developed in Lerner, Women and
Involuntary Hospitalization: An Equal Protection Problem (1972) (unpublished
paper on file with the Center for the Study of Legal Authority and Mental
Patient Status). With a factual basis adjusted to the context, the arguments
presented in this paper suggest the possibility of analogous application of the
equal protection clause in cases involving actual or prospective commitment of
low-income individuals, non-white persons, and cultural minorities.
27. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 154 (1933).
See also Benjamin, Anatomy Is Destiny?-Reflections by the Editor, FORUM(Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute, 1300 University Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin
53706), No. 2, 1971, at 27-30, and Brown, Male Supremacy in Freud, THE
RADICAL THERAPIST, Sept. 1971, at 2-4.
28. CHESLER, supra note 26, at 77 citing Pollack, Redick, & Taube, The
Application of Census Socioeconomic and Familial Data to the Study of Mor-
bidity from Mental Disorders, 58 AMER. J. PUBL. HEALTH 1 (1968).
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[W]oman is nurturance .... [A]natomy decrees the life
of a woman .... When women grow up without sub-
version by feminist doctrines and therefore enter upon moth-
erhood with a sense of fulfillment and altruistic sentiment
we shall attain the goal of a good life and a secure world
in which to live.29
Finally, for present purposes, Dr. Theodore Lidz, Chairman of the
Department of Psychiatry of the Yale University School of Medi-
cine, in a discussion of personality development differentiating
the normal roles in sexual or, perhaps more accurately, sexist
terms, states:
The little girl usually comes to terms in one way or another
with the absence of the desired penis. . . Obviously, not all
girls will accept their feminity. Some will simply enter mas-
culine occupations, but some will seek to act out and live a
male role, including a sexual role .... 30
There is evidence to indicate that these sexist doctrines are
reflected in the views of the average contemporary clinician,
with interesting consequences. Thus, a recent study, based on
a questionnaire answered by seventy-nine clinicians, forty-six
male and thirty-three female, indicated no differences among
male and female clinicians with regard to a sexist clinical orien-
tation. 1 In the course of the study, clinicians checked off traits
representing the qualities of healthy males, healthy females,
and healthy adults, sex unspecified. What was considered healthy
for adults, sex unspecified, was similar to what was considered
healthy for adult males, and correlated with previous studies
of social desirability as perceived by nonprofessional subjects.
"Healthy" women, however, were seen as more submissive, less
independent, less adventurous, more easily influenced, less ag-
gressive, less competitive, more excitable in minor crises, more
easily hurt, more emotional, more vain, and less objective. Dr.
Robert Seidenberg remarks about such attitudes that "we learn
from good psychoanalytic authority that not only is a woman to
be dominated but she will become neurotic if she is not. To
be dominated then becomes an imperative for mental health for
women; this, the doctor's prescription!
32
Dr. Phyllis Chesler, a clinical psychologist, has concluded
29. CHESLER, supra note 26, at 77 citing RHEINGOLD, THE FEAR OF BEING
A WOMAN (1964).
30. Lim, THE PERSON: His DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE CYCLE
214-17 (1968).
31. Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, and Vogel, Sex Role
Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health, 34 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 5 (1970).
32. Seidenberg, Oedipus and Male Supremacy, THE RADICAL TIERAPIST
147-48 (The Radical Therapist Collective ed. 1971).
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that there is, in effect, a "masculine standard of mental health,"
in which women are "psychiatrically impaired-whether they
accept or reject the female role-simply because they are wom-
en. '"" Dr. Judith Bardwick similarly notes that the psychiatric
view of women makes femininity "a sort of natural pathol-
ogy."'8 4  Women who rebel against their restricting "normal"
role will be powerful, active, rational, possibly not interested in
children-and sick according to a psychiatric viewpoint which
considers such traits abnormalities in women.
The forms of "treatment" which follow upon the applica-
tion of psychiatric labels according to the criteria indicated in the
foregoing analysis reflect the sexist bias of psychiatric prescrip-
tion as well as diagnosis. Sex roles are strictly indoctrinated and
enforced in mental institutions. Wearing skirts and nylons, us-
ing cosmetics, and performing similar "female" activities are fre-
quently required as evidence of "rehabilitation."3 For example,
an ex-inmate of a Pennsylvania mental institution reports that
her doctor told her she could not be released until she stopped
wearing boots and jeans and started wearing a skirt. 6
A second report concerning a Pennsylvania institution indi-
cates that female patients in a behavior modification "therapy"
program must earn tokens to pay for meals, bedding, admission
to the dayroom, or any other "privileges." To earn tokens, an
inmate must wear lipstick, make the beds in the men's ward,
cut up rags for rag rugs, perform janitorial tasks, or wear a gir-
dle.8 7
Submissiveness and obedience are also demanded of women
patients.8a Four doctors published a study in which they de-
scribed their attempts to reduce the aggressive behavior of a
woman by shocking her with a cattle prod whenever she threat-
ened an aggressive act.39  Of course, this "experiment" is among
33. CHESLER, supra note 26, at 115.
34. BARDWICK, PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A BIO-CULTURAL CONFLICT (1971).35. CHESLER, supra note 26, at 226; Grogan, Psychiatry By Any Other
Name Is Sexist Oppression (1972) (unpublished paper on file with the Center
for the Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient Status).
36. This same woman indicated that her admitting diagnosis was "Sexual
acting out-if not hospitalized might get pregnant or get VD." Cekala, If ThisBe Insanity, ROUGH TIMES, Sept. 1972, at 2. Cf. Henley, Feminist Research,
ROUGH TIMES, Sept. 1972, at 18. See also Grogan, supra note 35.37. Levering, She Must Be Some Kind of Nut, ROUGH TIMES, Sept. 1972,
at 3.
38. Dr. Chesler reports that if female "anger or aggressiveness persists, the
women are isolated, straitjacketed, and given shock therapy." CHESLER, supra
note 26, at 36.
39. Ludwig, Marx, Hill, & Browning, The Control of Violent BehaviorThrough Faradic Shock: A Case Study, 148 J. NERV. & MENTAL DISEASES 624(1969).
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the more bizarre, but not entirely atypical, forms of "therapy."
It was in fact a supervised experiment. The results were con-
sidered worthy of publication in a professional journal. Such an
experiment serves as an indication of the extent to which sexual
bias has played a role in psychiatric diagnosis, labelling and treat-
ment. Sexual bias is just of one of many forms of cultural
bias. We have explored it in depth because it furnishes a dra-
matic and timely example of the larger problem.
Problems Transcending Methodology
None of the foregoing is intended to deny that physicians
and psychiatrists have devised a number of systems of interac-
tion and medication which might be of substantial benefit to a
variety of individuals experiencing problems in living or difficul-
ties in communication resulting in a micro-social breakdown.
Our point is rather that these practitioners have failed to delimit
a recognizable area of human behavior as their material. In at-
tempting to deal with "mental disease," their errors of conceptu-
alization and method have resulted in diagnostic terms of suffi-
cient generality and abstraction that virtually anyone can mani-
fest symptoms or fit some category of mental "illness." In short,
medical science has not succeeded in defining pathology; conse-
quently psychiatric labels are applied on the basis of purely sub-
jective considerations rather than as a function of objective med-
ical-scientific diagnosis.
Our criticism has thus far dealt with the form of "psychia-
tric science." We have pointed to methodological difficul-
ties: the failure to apply a genuinely scientific approach, and
resulting ambiguity in the development and bias in the applica-
tion of critical terms.40 The basis of the discipline, apart from
the question of methodological and conceptual rigor, must re-
main in those definitions of health and illness which arise from the
value systems of individual scientists. No amount of methodo-
logical discipline and collective agreement can yield an objective
definition of health and illness, which are inherently value-laden
terms when applied to behavior or patterns of thought.4'
40. A summary of a number of criticisms of psychiatry and psychoanalysis
is given in A. ROGow, THE PSYCHIATRISTS, 17-30 (1970).
41. For an illustration of one attempt to define "schizophrenia" in bio-
chemical terms see Clue to Cause of Dreaded Mental Illness, San Francisco
Chronicle, Jan. 24, 1972, at 3. Even the correlation of allegedly pathological
behaviors with unusual biochemical conditions is not scientific proof of the
pathological nature of such conditions. The task of correlating deviant be-
havior with pathology in a medical-scientific sense would require value judg-
ments about behavior. Such an exercise is inherently subjective. For a more ex-
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We have attempted thus far to articulate and support our
position that mental illness is a term both ambiguous and over-
broad. We have also indicated several areas in which the ambi-
guity of this concept in conjunction with the subjective biases of
individual theorists and clinicians may result in its arbitrary
or discriminatory application. In cases involving a court hearing
on the question of commitment, the legal process poses a barrier
between unfettered psychiatric discretion and the patient/victim.
That barrier is often flimsy, but it is at least there. In one area,
however, the law has abdicated, surrendering decision-making to
the health professionals. An examination of that area should fur-
ther illustrate the dangers of concentrating power over others in
the hands of those who, benevolent or not, use suspect tools of
classification. The next sections therefore present an analysis
of emergency commitment statutes and of the events which be-
fall individuals who are detained for at least temporary observa-
tion, diagnosis, and treatment under authority of these statutes.
The states have explicitly labelled as emergency statutes those
which provide for immediate apprehension and hospitalization
of persons accused of mental illness by designated officials, typ-
ically health or police officers. On the theory of some form of med-
ical emergency, forty-four jurisdictions provide for immediate
apprehension and incarceration of the "mentally il.''42  The be-
tended discussion and critique of this kind of hypothesis see Rossabi, Anti-
Psychiatry: An Interview with Dr. Joseph Berke, in R.D. LAING AND ANTI-
PSYCHIATRY 277-80 (Boyers and Orrill eds. 1971). For an illustrative ex-
change of arguments on this issue see Balancing Terms, letter of Franklin E.
Kemeny, and the editorial reply, in PLAYBOY, June 1972, at 74.
42. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.030 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501,
36-507 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-102, 59-406 (1971); CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-3 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5122
(Cum. Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-521 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.463 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-504.2 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 334-54 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd; Supp. 1971);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1222 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908 (Supp. 1971);
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 202.027, 202.117 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:57(1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2333 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 59, § 22 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (1972);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.19 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.04
(1971); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 202.800, 202.803, 475.355 (Supp. 1971); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 38-208.1 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-357 (1971);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 433-671 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.21-a (1964);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-37 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-18 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 76 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-59
(Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.10 (Page 195, 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 426.175, 426.180, 426.215
(1971); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 141 (1955); PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4405
(1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-956 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-603 (Supp.
[Vol. 13
1973] EMERGENCY COMMITMENT STATUTES 413
havior warranting immediate confinement need not be a viola-
tion of any criminal statute. Rather, a diagnosis of mental ill-
ness grounds the legislative inference that what may in itself be
a harmless act is indicative of potential danger.
Twenty-seven of the provisions designated as emergency
statutes by the states impose a standard of dangerousness to
self or to the person or property of others. 43 In ten of the forty-
four jurisdictions, the sole or an alternative criterion for im-
mediate confinement is still more vague." Wisconsin, for ex-
ample, provides for emergency commitment when "safety requires
it .... ,14 Arkansas authorizes immediate detention of "any
insane . . . person . . . at large. . .. "
In thirty of the forty-four jurisdictions in question, incarcer-
ation is possible without a prior medical examination.47 Typically,
under these statutes the initial decision regarding commitment is
made by a sheriff or a health or police officer. Thus, initial con-
finement is permitted without judicial safeguards.
A second type of emergency procedure operates in twenty-
seven jurisdictions.48  This mode authorizes treatment upon medi-
cal certification of the need for it by one or two doctors. This pro-
1972); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-27 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 64-7-34, 64-7-35 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7505 (1968); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.03.020 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-1 (1971),
27-5-2 (1972); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.04 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-
58 (1967).
43. The standard in Del. is typical, providing for emergency commitment
if the person is "so mentally ill as to be likely to cause injury to himself or
others and to require immediate care, treatment or restraint." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5122 (Cum. Supp. 1970). Similar provisions in other jurisdic-
tions are cited at note 42, supra, for Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Colo., D.C., Fla., Ga.,
Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Nev., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Ore., Tex., Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo.
Dangerousness, even as an alleged function or product of mental illness, is
not a quality susceptible of objective definition or perception. Any method
for emergency detention based on such a criterion relies on the examiner's sub-
jective impressions of what past acts, thoughts, or present demeanors warrant
a prediction of future "dangerous" behavior.
44. See statutes cited at note 42, supra, for Ark., Cal., Hawaii, La., Neb.,
N.Y., Ore., P.R., Utah, & Wis. Puerto Rico authorizes emergency commitment
with no specified standard but simply with notice to the prosecuting attorney
within 24 hours after admission. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 141 (1955). A
legislative statement of motives for this provision mentions that there are many
persons who cannot afford the judicial process but whose mental condition re-
quires that treatment of their disorders be commenced at the earliest possible
moment without the delays and deferments which such proceedings in court
would require. Statement of Motives Act, May 12, 1945, No. 235, cited at
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 141 (1955).
45. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.04 (Supp. 1973).
46. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 59-102 (1971).
47. See statutes note 42 supra for Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., D.C.,
Fla., Hawaii, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Nev., N.Y.,
N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ore., P.R., Tex., Utah, Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo.
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cedure also dispenses with judicial safeguards, but provides for at
least one medical examination prior to admission.49 Of the
twenty-seven jurisdictions with this type of provision, twenty-
four require some form of danger,50 while three are more gen-
eral."'
These two types of emergency provisions authorize, in mostjurisdictions, long periods of observation and treatment with no
meaningful judicial protection.
A third type, emergency observation and diagnosis, is pro-
vided for in three states.52 The time limitation on permissible
detention under these provisions ranges from one day53 to sixty
days.54  For instance, in Colorado, a statement may be filed by
"any reputable person," accompanied by a doctor's certificate
that observation and treatment would be in the person's "best in-
terest." If the documents present a "satisfactory showing" to ajudge, he may authorize a three-month period of detention with-
out a hearing. This initial period may be extended for an addi-
tional three months by a further court order. 5
After the expiration of the initial emergency period, theperson may continue to be hospitalized under provisions which
permit detention pending the judicial proceeding for involuntary
hospitalization. 56  Thus, a long period of incarceration is possible
without any judicial review. Some jurisdictions provide minor
48. See statutes note 42 supra for Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Conn., Del., Fla.,Ga., Hawaii, Ill., Ky., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., N.H., N.J.,N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Ore., Pa., S.C., Tenn., Utah, W. Va.
49. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.020 (1972) and MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 253A.04 (1971).
50. See statutes at note 42 supra for Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Conn., Del., Fla.,Ga., Ill., Ky., Me., Mass., Minn., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Ore.,
Penn., S.C., Tenn., Utah, W.Va.
51. See statutes at note 42 supra for Hawaii, Mich., Mont. The Montana
criterion is "suffering from acute mania or circular insanity and requires imme-diate hospitalization ...... The Alaska statute has a requirement of injury to
self as a criterion or the general criterion of "in need of immediate hospitaliza-
tion. ... ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.030 (1972).
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 28:57 (1969); and N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 78 (McKinney 1971).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.463 (Supp. 1973).54. OIo REV. STAT. ANN. § 5122.08 (Page 61, 1970). A court order on
receipt of the doctor's certificate must authorize the sixty-day detention, but no
hearing is required.
55. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4 (1963).
56. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-4 (1963) providing for ex-
tension of the initial three-month involuntary hospitalization for an additionalperiod not to exceed a total of six months. Section 71-1-5 provides for incar-
ceration of a mentally ill person pending final determination of his mental
condition. The time within which final determination must be made is left
unclear.
[Vol. 13
1973] EMERGENCY COMMITMENT STATUTES 415
safeguards, such as notice to relatives or friends57 or examination
by a staff doctor upon admission or shortly thereafter5 8 for patients
admitted without medical certification. Nevertheless, a person
accused of mental illness may be incarcerated under these emer-
gency procedures on the basis of medical authority before legal
safeguards are available. Thus, he may have to prepare for any
subsequent judicial hearing from within the confines of the disor-
ienting hospital environment and often under heavy sedation.59
The use of extraordinary procedures in handling accusa-
tions of mental illness and incarcerating the person so accused is
usually defended on the ground that the problem situation is
medical, rather than moral or political. The proceeding is there-
fore said to be civil, not criminal and the purpose of confinement
is not punishment, but rehabilitation.
This rationale for emergency commitment procedures also
underlies involuntary commitment generally. However, the pro-
cedural apparatus and programs for diagnosis and treatment
which exist pursuant to these emergency statutes are peculiarly
57. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-507 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 5122 (Cum. Supp. 1970); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 334-54 (1968); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03-10 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-18 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-956 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.03.030 (1962);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (1971); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-58 (1967).
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-
5401, provides some safeguards for persons involuntarily detained. Detention
for evaluation is limited to a 72-hour period, sec. 5151; evaluation and treatment
is to be provided as soon as possible after admission, sec. 5152; reasonable pre-
cautions must be taken to safeguard the personal property of the person taken
into custody, secs. 5156, 5210; certification for involuntary treatment may not
exceed 14 days, sec. 5250; additional intensive treatment may not exceed 14
days, sec. 5260.
58. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 369.463 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-504.4 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 12 (1972); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03-10 (1970) (within twenty days of admission); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 426.215 (1971); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-30 (Supp. 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7505 (1968); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.03.030
(1962).
59. In addition to the emergency provisions, there are other types of stat-
utes which are functionally similar in that they permit incarceration of the
alleged mentally ill person on the basis of medical authority prior to the avail-
ability of procedural safeguards. These statutes include: voluntary provisions,
which typically authorize immediate temporary involuntary detention for a per-
son who entered the hospital voluntarily but subsequently decides to leave
against medical advice; the medical certification type statutes, which authorize
commitment entirely on medical authority; and the provisions for judicial com-
mitment pending a hearing, which authorize immediate detention on a court
order solely on the basis of medical testimony and the concept of mental illness.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5125 (Cum. Supp. 1970); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135:21-a (1964). Del. allows detention in the state hospital for an
indeterminate period on the basis of a certificate signed by two medical doctors,
licensed to practice medicine or surgery in the state, who have examined the
allegedly ill person. The New Hampshire provision is similar.
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dependent upon the medical/civil model. The statutes we have
discussed concern situations of urgency which can be under-
stood only in terms of medical authority. Supposedly, the predic-
tive character of medical categories tells us on the basis of past
behavior what a person will do in future. The nature of the
presumed emergency consists in a putatively rational inference
concerning the accused person's future behavior. The inference
is rational only if the premise is correct; as we have seen, however,
psychiatry is not capable of predicting future behavior with any
degree of certainty. Presently, on the basis of the predictive value
of psychiatry, procedural safeguards are suspended to permit im-
mediate detention without bail. Preventive detention which
would not be allowed for a person accused of a specific criminal
act is thus routinely allowed for one accused of merely aberrant
behavior or "dangerous mental illness."
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PERSON ACCUSED OF
MENTAL ILLNESS UNDER AN EMERGENCY
COMMITMENT STATUTE
The accused person's experience of involuntary mental hos-
pitalization under the emergency provisions begins with appre-
hension and incarceration and proceeds through intake proced-
ures to preliminary treatments. Under emergency commitment
provisions, the prospective patient's introduction to "therapy"
typically consists of physical apprehension by a health or police
officer.60 Erving Goffman, a sociologist, has described the situa-
60. The Colorado statute is typical, providing in pertinent part: "Any sher-
iff or peace officer, who in good faith believes that a person is mentally ill ... ,
and that such person is apt to injure or endanger himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty, may take the person into protective custody and place him in
a suitable place of custody pending an order of the court ....... CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 71-1-3 (1963). In California, where the standard commitment
provision, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West 1972), provides for a
72-hour incarceration prior to the possibility of a hearing, each county specifies
the individual or agency authorized to take prospective involuntary patients into
custody, and each county does this differently.
For example, Sacramento and Santa Barbara Counties designate the
"professional staff" of their respective Mental Health Services as
having authority to sign 72-hour holds for evaluation. San Mateo
County just gives a list of seven hospitals or mental health centers
which possess such authority. On the other hand, Santa Clara County
lists licensed physicians, psychologists, social workers, public health
nurses and clergymen, whereas Marin County designates peace officers,
staff of their Mental Health Center and Mental Health Services, as
well as ambulance staff under explicit instructions from the Mental
Health Center or Services. Letter of Robert K. Patch, Attorney,
California Department of Mental Hygiene, Bureau of Guardianship,
July 18, 1972.
Although there are two statutory provisions governing the 72-hour hold in
California, the judicial procedure, CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 5200 (West
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tion of the inmate who is newly arrived at a state mental institu-
tion, whether for a temporary detention period or for a more pro-
longed stay.6 The inmate comes into the establishment with a
conception of self in part derived from and supported by a stable
system of social arrangements in the home and "outside" world.
The inmate is immediately stripped of the support provided by
family and friends, perhaps a stable work situation, and other so-
cial supports.62 In addition to this loss,
[t]he process of entrance typically brings other kinds of
loss and mortification as well. We very generally find staff
employing what are called admission procedures, such as
taking a life history, photographing, weighing, fingerprint-
ing, assigning numbers, searching, listing personal possessions
for storage, undressing, bathing, disinfecting, haircutting, is-
suing institutional clothing, instructing as to rules, and as-
signing to quarters. Admission procedures might better be
called "trimming" or "programming" because in thus be-
ing squared away the new arrival allows himself to be shaped
and coded into an object that can be fed into the administra-
tive machinery of the establishment, to be worked on smooth-
ly by routine operations.6 3
Admission procedures also contribute to a loss of identity
or self-image by permitting confiscation of personal possessions.
An individual's possessions have a special relation to self, and a
special function to perform in maintaining the self-image. One's
appearance before others is maintained by what Goffman has
called an "identity kit" consisting of clothing, hair style, and re-
lated paraphernalia.64 Upon admission to a mental institution,
however, the inmate is stripped of this equipment. Personal
clothing, combs, needle and thread, cosmetics, towels, soap, shav-
ing sets, bathing facilities-all may be taken away from or de-
nied to the inmate, while "the institutional issue provided as a
substitute for what has been taken away is typically of a 'coarse'
variety, ill-suited, often old, and the same for a large category of
inmates." 65
1972), is apparently seldom used. Most commitments occur under the non-
judicial provision, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West 1972). A medi-
cal program consultant at Napa State Hospital states that in his experience, new
inmates are typically brought in by a physician or a policeman, "most often by
a peace officer." Interview with A.S. Linn, M.D. at Napa State Hospital, Imola,
California, June 1, 1972.
61. GoFFmAN, ASYLUMS (1961) esp. at 12-48 and 131-46.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 20.
65. Id. at 20. Inmates of California mental institutions now have the
right to wear their own clothing, to keep and use personal toilet articles, and to
have access to individual storage space for private use. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
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Apart from the degrading implications of this potentially
long-term deprivation of the "identity kit," the newly arrived
inmate may suffer some indignity at the physical stripping which
accompanies examination upon admission. "The admission
procedure can be characterized as a leaving off and a taking on,
with the midpoint marked by physical nakedness."'60
Other forms of physical indignity which would be particu-
larly distressing to a newly committed inmate abound in the insti-
tutional environment. For example, in some institutions all in-
mates are denied a knife and fork and forced to eat with a
spoon.67 Inmates also may face the necessity of begging or hum-
bly asking for favors such as a light for a cigarette, a drink of
water, or permission to use the telephone. 8
In addition to such "incidental" forms of abasement, which
might be seen as degrading the incidents of the individual's self-
image, physical invasion of the inmate's body occurs in a variety
of ways.6 9 The administration of tranquilizing drugs is one ex-
ample of such physical invasion. Administration of tranquilizers,
while making the accused person more manageable, damages his
sense of physical security and contributes to his overall feeling
of disorientation in the alien environment of the mental institu-
tion. Apart from the occasionally brutal manner in which drugs
are administered, 0 the evidence indicates that immediate heavy
CODE § 5325 (West 1972). This so-called "patient bill of rights" provision in
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act has been cited by another author in a context
which seems appropriate, as follows:
A person's rights under Section 5325 may be denied for good cause
only by the professional person in charge of the facility or his designee.
• . . CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326 (West Supp. 1971)[A]nd the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the
name of the Lord. Job 1:21 (italics omitted).
Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 616 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Note].
66. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 18. One ex-patient who was briefly incar-
cerated at Napa State Hospital characterized her physical examination upon ad-
mission as an intensely humiliating experience. She was placed nude on an ex-
amining table in the presence of a number of female attendants, at least several
of whom laughed at her physical appearance. One commented, "Isn't she a
skinny one?" to the apparent amusement of the others. Following her internal
examination, one of the attendants commented upon a particular gynecological
symptom, in response to which another one of the women present said "Oh, let
me seel" as several of them came over to "gawk and laugh." Interview with
Carla B., December 9, 1972.
67. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 22 citing THE PLEA FOR aE SILENT 16(D. McI. Johnson and N. Dodds, eds. 1957).
68. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 22.
69. Id. at 23.
70. An ex-patient reported that at one point during her stay at Napa State
Hospital, repeated doses of drugs mixed with orange juice and administered
orally were making her nauseated. When she complained, the supervising physi-
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sedation by drugs is standard practice rather than extreme re-
sponse applied only in unusual cases. 71 The chemical tranquil-
ization of incoming inmates becomes a significant factor in the
overall nullification of the accused person's ability to resist con-
tinued detention. It has been observed that Thorazine, for ex-
ample, which is an agent commonly used in preliminary treat-
ment, "has the undisputed effect of depriving the patient of initi-
ative and the will to resist."'72
cian replied to the attending technician in her presence, "'ell her if she won't
take it orally we'll give it to her with the needle, and it'll be worse.' " Inter-
view with Carla B., June 2, 1972.
An ex-patient in Wisconsin wrote: "As a committed patient, I was forced
to take drugs (Thorazine) even though I insisted that taking drugs violated my
religious convictions . . .To settle the matter, a nurse called me into the treat-
ment room and asked, 'How do you want to take this-by mouth or shall I give
it to you in the butt?' I indicated that I preferred to take the drug by mouth.
Her reply was, 'Well, since I have it already in a hypo, I think I'll give it to you
in the butt.' That was my introduction to Thorazine ....... Anonymous,
An Ex-Patient Views Involuntary Commitment, Forum, (a publication of the
Wisc. Psychiatric Institute, 1300 Univ. Ave., Madison, Wisc. 53706) No. 1,
1972 at 9.
71. One person who reported to a psychiatric emergency room in California
stated that shortly after her arrival a nurse gave her two tablets, mentioning
they were Thorazine. A half hour later she was given two additional tablets.
She decided to leave and ran out of the emergency room to her home. There
she fell asleep for a period of three days with at most a few brief interruptions.
Interview with Carla B., June 2, 1972. Another woman who was hospitalized
several times wrote: "With each hospitalization, I was given an immediate seda-
tive. For introduction it was always Thorazine, usually followed by mellaril or
stelazine, haldol or some other shit." Written communication from Samantha
D., June 13, 1972.
Interviews with medical personnel confirm the frequency of immediate
sedation. Thus it is estimated that 90% of persons brought to Napa State
Hospital under the 72-hour provision of CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150
(West 1972) are given medication immediately upon admission. Interview
with A.S. Linn, M.D., Medical Program Consultant, at Napa State Hospital,
Imola, California, June 1, 1972. "I cannot generalize as to the exact nature of
the drugs used except to state that it is usually a tranquillizing drug of the
phenothiazine type." Written communication from Dr. Linn, June 8, 1972.
There are fifty wards at Napa, a dozen admitting wards. At the admission
wards the philosophies differ, so that there are some where all persons admitted
are drugged, some where none are, and some where the medication is temporary.
Interview with Dr. Gordon Riley, Chief Psychologist, at Napa State Hospital,
June 1, 1972.
Further data offer an additional perspective on this practice of immediate
medication. "When a person first comes in, he or she is heavily doped up
then the dosage is gradually adjusted. They dose them heavily at first because
they don't know how much is needed to knock them out." Interview with Mr.
Ted Adams, Director of the Stiles Hall Napa Volunteer Project, June 2, 1972.
A volunteer in the Napa program who works on a chronic ward said that the
staff is concerned simply with making it from day to day. "Perhaps the staff
finds more placid behavior preferable, or that they are trying a new medica-
tion," but in any case most patients are under pharmaceutical medication con-
stantly. Interview with Ms. Holly Floersch, Stiles Hall Napa Project Volunteer,
June 2, 1972.
72. Ennis, supra note 22, at 116. See, e.g., Mental Illness and Due Process,
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Besides drugging, other treatment modalities such as shock
treatment and psychosurgery may be inflicted upon a person ad-
mitted under emergency procedures shortly after admission and
prior to a court hearing. There are statutory safeguards against
such treatment in only a few states.7 3  The existence of such limi-
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1962) at 26: "But tranquilizers
reach the very source of the will to resist. Since a patient who has been ad-
mitted to a mental hospital without his consent may not be in a position to ob-ject to his continued detention because of the nature of his illness or the initial
steps in its treatment, his rights must be protected as fully as those of the pa-
tient who voices his protest." (Emphasis added).
It has been pointed out that "an important consideration in prescribing
medicine is the physician's clear and honest awareness of the person for whom
the medication is given; is it for the patient, for the family, for the physician, or
for a social organization? ... In the psychiatric practice, we see the whole-
sale application of tranquilizing drugs for the benefit of the institution, that is,
physicians, nurses and administrators, and not always solely for the patient's
sake." REDLICH & FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 818
(1966).
Dr. Eli C. Messinger, instructor and psychiatrist certified by the Amer.
Board of Psychiatry and Neurology states that
[p]henothiazines are the drugs most often used on hospitalized mentalpatients. Chlorpromazine (Thorazine) is the most frequently used
phenothiazine compound. All the phenothiazines have several character-
istics in common which would have a bearing on the question of initia-
tive and will to resist. First, they make the patient sleepy, particularly
in the first few days of administration. Second, they cloud the mind and
make thinking, especially independent thinking, difficult. Third, they
make the patient more indifferent to his surroundings, his own symp-
toms, and his life situations. Fourth, they make the patient more tract-
able, passive and manageable. . . ." Dr. Messinger concludes that "the
very common practice of using high doses of phenothiazines on recently
admitted mental patients significantly reduces the possibility of legal
action being initiated by the patient."
Letter of Eli C. Messinger, M.D., December 2, 1972.
73. Few jurisdictions limit the types of permissible treatment during the
emergency period. In California, patients can refuse shock treatment and
lobotomy during the initial 72-hour detention period. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 5325 (West 1972). But these rights may be denied by the professional
staff. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326 (West 1972), and note 65, supra.
In practice, the patient's objection to electro-shock within the 72-hour period at
Napa State Hospital is disregarded upon agreement of three physicians and one
administrator. Interview with A.S. Linn, M.D., Medical Program Consultant, at
Napa State Hospital, Imola, California, June 1, 1972. Michigan prohibits
shock treatment during the emergency period. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §
330.19 (Supp. 1972). Tennessee prohibits "psychosurgery, convulsive treat-
ment or insulin treatment until a court order is obtained." TENN. CODE ANN.§ 33-603 (1972). Washington provides that treatment ". . . except for emer-
gency surgery, shall be limited to medications and treatment procedures tem-
porary and moderate in effect, and for the benefit of the person detained ..
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.03.04 (1962).
Other statutes provide very insubstantial limitations on treatment. Thus in
Florida "a patient who is admitted for an emergency examination and treatment
...may be given such treatment as is indicated by good medical practice."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.463 (Supp. 1973). In Georgia, a patient who is re-
ceived by an emergency receiving facility ". . . may be given such emergency
treatment as is indicated by good medical practice ... " GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-504.4 (1971).
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tations in these states may indicate that in most jurisdictions,
where such provisions do not exist, doctors may have the legal
right and power to use such extreme modes of treatment.74
It is not contended that such power is widely used by medi-
cal authorities. However, the knowledge that such treatment is
possible will contribute to the newly arrived inmate's sense of
insecurity if he feels that he is "in an environment that does not
guarantee [his] physical integrity. '7 5  Certainly the newly ar-
rived inmate at a mental institution, disoriented, unrepresented
by counsel, and labelled mentally ill so that all his perceptions
are suspect, is hardly in a position to wage an effective contest
over treatment modalities with the hospital administration.
In addition to such personally disorienting factors as incar-
ceration, physical insecurity, invasions of privacy, and heavy
sedation, the accused person apprehended under emergency pro-
cedures faces a number of logistical difficulties in exercising his
legal rights under hospital conditions. For example, though some
states provide for notification of rights by statute, the hopsital ad-
ministration is typically assigned to dispense this information. 76
Since the hospital is the adversary party in subsequent court pro-
ceedings, it would seem less than judicious to delegate this func-
tion to its administration. 77 While it is true that in the adminis-
It would be extremely difficult methodologically to determine the extent of
electric or chemical shock treatment administered to persons incarcerated under'
emergency provisions and awaiting a judicial hearing. For example, in Cal-
ifornia the only record of the administration of shock treatment over an in-
mate's objection would appear in his treatment record. This information is in
turn available only to the person, his attorney, conservator or guardian, the
State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, legislature, or a member of the county board
of supervisors. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326 (West 1972).
74. The procedure for authorizing the administration of electric shock treat-
ment over a patient's objection during the emergency detention period at Napa
State Hospital in California is outlined in note 73, supra. Dr. Linn indicated
that such a step would be a rare occurrence. Interview with A.S. Linn, M.D.,
supra note 73. But of course the very existence of this procedure indicates the
possibility of its exercise.
75. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 21.
76. See note 77, infra.
77. Even in states with the most elaborate mechanisms presently in existence
for notification of legal rights to inmates accused of mental illness, there is
evidence that such notice does not always occur. In a recent case rejecting a
challenge to the constitutionality of sections 72 and 78 of NEw YORK MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW, for example, the court noted that
Upon admission, (the patient] must be immediately notified of his
rights, including his right to a judicial hearing as to the need for hos-
pitalization. . . . And, moreover, the Mental Health Information Serv-
ice is charged with the duty of reviewing his admission and retention
and of advising him, as well as others interested in his welfare, of his
right to have a judicial hearing, with counsel, and to seek independent
medical opinion. [N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law See. 78, subd. 2; Sec. 88]
Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 354-55 (1972).
Nevertheless at least one ex-patient who had been hospitalized several times in
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tration of the criminal law, the same officers charged with enforce-
ment are also responsible for informing suspects of their legal
rights, a number of factors distinguish emergency commitments
from the apprehension of criminal suspects. Perhaps the most
significant of these is that the criminal defendant typically knows
from the moment he is apprehended that he is involved in an ad-
versary proceeding. He is thus likely to think in terms of "pro-
tecting his rights" and to that end of "getting a lawyer." In ad-
dition, as a result of popular controversy over a number of Su-
preme Court decisions78 concerning the rights of criminal defend-
ants, he is more likely than the person accused of mental illness
to be aware that he has certain rights and that among these is
the right of access to counsel.
By contrast, the person accused of mental illness is likely
to be reassured at every stage of the commitment process that the
people responsible for his incarceration want only to "help" him
and are acting "for his own good."79  The medical professionals
New York mental hospitals wrote: "Never once was I informed of my rights
and I never received legal assistance of any kind." Written communication
from Samantha D., June 13, 1972.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325 (West 1972) enumerates patients'
rights and provides that a list of rights be prominently posted in English and
Spanish at all psychiatric facilities. One ex-patient familiar with such facilities
stated that she never saw any rights posted in any language, and that she was
never informed either orally or otherwise of her rights to obtain counsel, to file
a writ of habeas corpus, to refuse shock treatment and lobotomy, and to make
and receive confidential telephone calls. Nor was she ever offered voluntary
treatment as provided in CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § § 5250 and 5260.
Following the initial 72-hour detention period, California permits certifica-
tion for intensive treatment for an additional 14-day period only in the case of
a dangerous or gravely disabled person. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5250(a).
The patient must receive notice of the certification, delivered personally. The
person delivering notice must inform him of his right to judicial review by a
writ of habeas corpus and explain the nature of this right. The same ex-patient
who complained of the failure of notice under sec. 5325 declared that she never
received any document of 14-day certification or any explanation although she
was detained under this provision. Interview with Carla B., June 2, 1972.
78. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
79. The position of the medical profession is discussed in Wenger & Fletcher,
supra note 2, at 66. Typical of the medical viewpoint is the statement that
"We would like our hospitals . . . to be looked upon as treatment centers for
sick people, and we want to be . . . considered as doctors and not jailers."
Braceland, Testimony, in CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL: PARr
I, CIVIL ASPECTS, 64-65 (1961), cited in SzAsz, Id. at 51. This desire for an
exclusively medical-scientific, to the exclusion of a legal-policy, perspective on
commitment is reflected in the statement of the Committee on Psychiatry and
Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. This statement spe-
cifically criticizes as "major defects" in present commitment laws such ele-
ments as mandatory or optional trial by jury, retention of procedures drawn
from the criminal law, and mandatory appearance of the patient in court.
Laws Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 95 (Allen, Ferster and Rubin ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as READ-
INGS]. "Hospital authorities are strongly opposed to the practice of jail deten-
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encourage him to take a cooperative, nonadversary attitude.
The new inmate may also be demoralized by the nature of the
proceedings against him, which at least formally constitute not a
charge of wrongdoing but an inquisition into the question of his
sanity. These factors are likely to combine with the disorient-
ing factors previously described to effectively prevent the accused
from securing the rights to which he is legally entitled. Fur-
thermore, as sociologist Thomas Scheff has observed:
It is difficult to understand the commitment process and the
organization of mental hospitals unless you understand that
commitments to mental hospitals are largely people without
social power, position or wealth. . . . Of course they can
be inarticulate, not familiar with their rights and legal pro-
cedures. Notions of getting a lawyer, for example, I would
think are rather foreign to these people even in their ordinary
life. . . . It seems to me that research on characteristics
in mental hospitals has established this beyond a reasonable
doubt.80
The person accused of mental illness, then, unlike the criminal
defendant, is not likely to be in either a position or a frame of mind
conducive to securing information as to his legal rights upon ad-
mission to the hospital.
The deficiencies in present procedures for notification of le-
gal rights are exacerbated by conflicts of interest between the pa-
tient and the hospital. As stated by one commentator:
There is an inherent conflict of interest between the hos-
pital and the patient on many matters. The patient may
be interested in optimal freedom to come and go, to socialize,
to have visitors and activities, to be free from arbitrary trans-
fers and punishments and searches. The hospital's inter-
ests may be in administrative convenience and quietude.8
Thus, administrative convenience for the hospital may conflict
with effective notice of the inmate's legal rights and the prospect
of "having a lot of lawyers around." This is not to suggest any
tion as well as to the transportation of patients in police conveyances." THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 43, n.88 (S. Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as BRAKEL & R. RocK]. For an elaboration and analysis* of
these attitudes on the part of medical professionals see SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE
OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 51-52 and sources cited therein. Dr. Szasz con-
cludes that:
If psychiatrists really wanted all those things, all they would have to
do is unlock the doors of mental hospitals, abolish commitment, and
treat only those persons who, like in nonpsychiatric hospitals, want to
be treated. Id. at 52.
80. Scheff, Testimony, Edited Transcript of Hearing of the Subcommittee
on Mental Health 39, Dec. 20, 1965.
81. Ferleger, Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, ROUGH TiMEs, Nov.
1972 at 7.
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cynical avoidance of these issues by hospital authorities, but
merely to point out that functional conflicts of interest do exist
between inmates and the institutional staff and administration.
The institutional psychiatrist plays a double role. On the one
hand, he must be a therapist to his patient, and on the other, a pro-
tector of society against the patient. s2  Since the possibility of
inmate-hospital conflicts of interest is obvious, "it becomes nec-
essary to try to avoid situations in which persons are placed in the
position of simultaneously representing opposing interests. ' 3
The absence of effective notice of legal rights is an obvious
handicap in preparing for the court proceedings which typically
follow upon, rather than precede, incarceration under emergency
commitment laws.8 4  More generally, the purely mechanical
problems involved in the preparation of any lawsuit are aggra-
vated for a person preparing his case from within a mental hos-
pital in the status of patient. His access to the telephone and the
opportunity to make and receive confidential calls may be re-
stricted. His mail may be censored. These problems are magni-
82. Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient, in READINGS, supra
note 79, at 222.
83. Id. at 222.
84. A study completed in 1968 for the American Bar Foundation states
that although detention is usually a function delegated to the police and other
administrative officers, judicial approval of the action remains a prerequisite in
fourteen states of those which have emergency commitment provisions. BRAKEL
& R. ROCK, supra note 79, at 43, n.90. The reader is then referred to Table 3.11,
Certification columns and footnotes thereto. The certification columns make
reference to 18 states wherein judicial certification of emergency detention is a
"prerequisite." A review of statutes currently in force in these jurisdictions
reveals only a few of the statutes named in the column in fact require judicial
certification of an emergency commitment application as a prerequisite. The
remainder of the states cited as requiring judicial certification do not always do
so, and some never do. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2908 (Supp. 1971) provides
only right to contact counsel or next of kin immediately and § 59-2909 (Supp.
1971) suspends the requirement of judicial certification upon application by
peace officer or any person, stating that a probate court is not available; KY.
REV. STAT. § 202.117 (1972) allows detention for 48 hours excluding weekends
and holidays); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19 (Supp. 1972) allows 48-hour
detentions, excluding Sundays and holidays, with approval of the prosecuting
attorney; NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.672 (1971) provides that the district attor-
ney may order detention; N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-38 (1964) states a court or-
der may come after commitment; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-59 (Cum. Supp. 1971)
provides that consent may be given by any licensed physician; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03-08 (1970) provides that consent may be given by member of
county mental health board; OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (Page 195)
(1970) authorizes detention for 5 days; TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-27
(Supp. 1972) limits detention to 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays, unless a written court order is obtained; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-34
(1971) requires endorsement by judge or head of the local board of health or a
member of the city board of commissioners; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-3
(1971) allows the clerk of the county court to issue warrants for detention
and examination by a physician, whose word in turn authorizes hospitalization.
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fied if the accused is indigent.8 5 For instance, finding a sym-
pathetic specialist attorney as an alternative to the court appointee
(if there is one) is difficult and expensive. Filling out writs and
similar legal papers leaves any nonlawyer, patient or not, at a loss.
Thus, by a variety of means the accused person may be made vir-
tually incapable of exercising his guaranteed rights and severely
handicapped in preparing for trial even if he manages to maintain
the motivation to defend himself.
It might be suggested that this entire range of problems
could be rectified by a statutory or administrative modification of
procedures within mental hospitals. However, a very limited
range of improvements is possible in the absence of adequate
recognition of the powerless and very likely disoriented status of
the accused person and of the inherent conflicts of interest be-
tween patient-inmate and hospital. The first necessity, in our
view, is active, adversary legal representation for all persons al-
leged to be mentally ill under emergency commitment laws. An
essential characteristic of this representation is that it takes a gen-
uinely adversary stance on behalf of the accused, and remains in-
dependent of vested interests which conflict with those of the
prospective inmate.88
EMERGENCY COMMITMENT AS A SELF-FULFILLING
PREDICTION
Without the intervention of active adversary counsel, it
seems likely that many persons incarcerated under present emer-
gency commitment procedures will have possibly insurmount-
able difficulty in obtaining genuine hearings on the question of
their release.8 7 It is difficult to imagine how any person suddenly
85. Statutory rights may not be available in practice to indigent persons.
An excellent example is provided in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (Supp.
1973). This provision allows for initial emergency detention by medical cer-
tification for a period of up to 45 days without any hearing or court order.
The only safeguard provided is the right to have one's private doctor as one of
the certifying doctors. If the person's own doctor does not find him mentally
ill, he cannot be confined under this provision. Obviously since this privi-
lege can only be exercised by persons under the regular care of a family physi-
cian or who are able to retain one, indigents will often be denied this safeguard.
86. The Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project of Philadelphia, Penn., is an
example of a type of legal services agency which could perhaps be a model for
future efforts. The Project, which is privately funded, has contracted with a
Pennsylvania state mental institution to provide legal and advocacy services to
patient-inmates. See Letter of David Ferleger, Mental Patient Civil Liberties
Project, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 430 (Nov. 1972).
87. The situation of the accused person in the typical case is perhaps
illuminated by the New York situation, which has the nationally atypical feature
of providing adversary counsel in a high proportion of cases. Studies conducted
at Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital by New York University Medical School per-
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and coercively detained, heavily drugged, and subjected to the
disorienting environment of a mental hospital could retain full
presence of mind. In this sense, under present procedures the
statutory provisions in question may effectively fulfill their own
prediction that the accused is mentally ill (and that therefore
emergency commitment is justified). The combination of pres-
sures to which the hospitalized person is immediately subject,
in conjunction with the threat of indefinite incarceration, must
understandably create a certain amount of anxiety in any indi-
vidual. By the time of the hearing, if there is one, many char-
acteristics which might be expected of the normal individual under
such circumstances, such as tension or nervousness, anxiety,
suspicion, and the like, may well have been observed in the ac-
cused person and duly recorded in the treatment record prior to
trial. Or perhaps the person has remained calm under such ad-
versity, either out of extraordinary self-control or as a result of se-
dation. From the medical perspective this behavior may be in-
terpreted as flat affect. Any impairment of coordination result-
ing from heavy drugging may be diagnosed as naturally impaired
coordination. In addition, if the accused is indignant at his in-
carceration and treatment, he may be described as exhibiting
symptoms of hostility or aggression. s8  Whether because of the
flexibility of diagnostic categories or as a result of the experience
of hospitalization, the accused person in these circumstances may
well exhibit "agitation," "disorientation," "loss of context," or
"depression," which in turn will be taken to indicate the presence
of "mental illness." On the basis of such "symptoms," the per-
son in question can be held for a lengthy period pending the out-
sonnel indicate that the percentage of patients discharged by judges after a
hearing was only 8.9 per cent in 1969. However, 40.4 per cent of all patients
who had requested a hearing were discharged by psychiatrists before the
hearing, despite initial recommendations for continued detention. While it
has been suggested that this phenomenon may be due in part to "the persistence
of the MHIS [Mental Health Information Service] in investigating suitable al-
ternatives to hospitalization," it is submitted that this remarkable situation must
result at least in part from the availability of counsel employed by the MHIS,
and the consequent "reluctance of psychiatrists to appear in court." Kramer,
Protective Legal Services for the Mentally Ill, 23 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIA-
TRY 253-54 (Aug. 1972). The presentation of a diagnosis based in conceptually
vague terms is no doubt simpler in the absence of an articulate and experienced
advocate prepared to subject medical conclusions to the scrutiny of cross-
examination, even when hearings are relatively informal.
88. For a description of at least two actual cases, see Solomon, Commit-
ment, ROUGH TIMES, Nov. 1972, at 8 and Greenberg, Become Mentally Healthy
or I'll Kill You, ROUGH TIMES, April 1972, at 16. The conclusion that such
superficial diagnoses may be common or even typical is supported by SZASZ,
THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 50 and Diamond, The Fallacy
of the Impartial Expert in READINGS, supra note 79, at 148.
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come of an eventual hearing.89 Of course it does not take any
very extraordinary powers of imagination to speculate that such
traits may well be observed in any person who has just been trans-
ported against his will and without explanation to a mental hos-
pital, drugged, and stored on the locked ward for a period of
several days.
If one accused of mental illness were required to report for
an examination pursuant to a court order, and not hospitalized
prior to that examination, he would be given adequate notice of
the nature of the proceedings against him. He would know
the stakes of the game and could prepare accordingly as far as his
resources would permit. On the other hand, within the hospital
there is nothing to insure that the patient will be informed of the
purpose of one particular medical examination among others to
which he may be subjected. It is difficult to say what response
could plausibly be expected of a "sane" individual under such cir-
cumstances. Uninformed of the purpose of the encounter, the
person might exhibit any of a variety of possible responses, in-
cluding unresponsiveness (labelled hostility or flat affect, de-
pending upon the mood or perception of the examiner). A so-
ciologist who studied the medical examination process in one jur-
isdiction noted that
one of the examiners always asked, "What year is it? What
year was it seven years ago? Seventeen years before that?"
etc. Only two of the five patients who were asked this series
of questions were able to answer it correctly. However, it is
a moot question whether a higher percentage of persons in a
household survey would be able to do any better. To my
knowledge, none of the orientation questions that are used
have been checked in a normal population. 90
Indeed, how many people, without any explanation of their purpose,
would be willing to answer such inane questions at all, except
perhaps out of a sympathetic concern for the obvious disorienta-
tion of the inquisitor? Only a person informed of the nature and
purpose of such an inquiry and of its possible consequences could
reasonably be expected to take it seriously.9
89. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (Supp. 1973), where a person
may be confined up to 45 days pending a court hearing upon filing of a cer-
tificate from a physician finding that such person is in need of care and a danger
to himself or others.
90. T. Scheff, Screening Mental Patients, in DEVIANCE: THE INTERACTIONIST
PERSPECTiVE 180 (Rubington and Weinberg ed. 1968).
91. A U.S. District Court in Wisconsin has held that individuals threatened
with involuntary commitment were entitled to the privilege against self-in-
crimination under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "The patient
should be told by counsel and the psychiatrist that he is going to be examined
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We thus suspect that any individual subjected to the emer-
gency commitment process will have a difficult time proving his
sanity under existing procedures. Nor do this suspicion and our
suggested hypothetical diagnoses fail to take adequate account of
psychiatric sensitivity and perception. On the contrary, psychi-
atrists involved with the commitment process do not seem particu-
larly perceptive. Although it is difficult to pin the tag of mal-
practice upon them,92 it is apparent that they are not altogether
objective.
For example, sociologist Thomas Scheff examined the role
played by court-appointed psychiatrists in justifying informal,
nonadversary commitment procedures in one midwestem
state.93  In research to ascertain whether a presumption of men-
tal illness occurred in the psychiatric screening process in that
jurisdiction, intensive observations of screening procedures were
conducted. 94 Scheff found that the procedures utilized usually
with regard to his mental condition, that the statements he may make may be
the basis for commitment, and that he does not have to speak to the psychia-
trist." Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
92. Several recent cases deal with negligent or fraudulent psychiatric cer-
tification or diagnosis which authorized plaintiff's temporary or emergency de-
tention. In many of these cases actions for damages for false imprisonment
were dismissed for not stating a cause of action, notwithstanding proven fraud
which resulted in deprivation of plaintiff's liberty. See U.S. ex rel Elliott v.
Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954), and
Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954) in which pleadings
alleging negligent and malicious examination and certification were insufficient
to state a cause of action; Keating v. Keller, 242 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1970)
where although the physician, who had never seen or examined plaintiff, falsely
signed coroner's commitment order as examining physician, the commitment was
upheld; Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162 (Me. 1969) in which a doctor who
falsely certified that he had examined the patient was held civilly liable; Di
Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (1969) where the court
found no denial of due process although the court appointed a psychiatrist
whose opinions were considered "unsound or dangerous" by most of the medical
profession; Brady v. Collom, 68 R.I. 299, 27 A.2d 311 (1942) stating fraudulent
testimony of doctors who had not made a full examination did not give the pa-
tient committed a cause of action where doctors did not institute proceedings;
Pate v. Stevens, 257 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) holding a charge of
malicious prosecution could not be maintained against the defendants, two
doctors, merely because statements in the affidavit that they had examined
patient within 5 days were false.
Several studies indicating the possibility of more rigorous and perhaps care-
ful diagnostic work in at least some instances are cited in T. SCHEFF, BainG
MENTALLY ILL, supra note 1, at 134, n.11.
93. T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 138.
94. Id. at 134-55. Lest it be thought that the results he obtained are
unique to a particularly backward state, Scheff notes that the particular state
studied is known for its progressive psychiatric practices, and that a number of
the psychiatrists employed as examiners had finished their psychiatric residen-
cies, which is not the case in many other states. Id. at 149. Scheff also notes
informal discussions of screening with judges and other court officials disclosed
that although the statutes give the courts responsibility for the decision to con-
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did not serve the function of screening out persons who do not
meet the statutory criteria governing who may be involuntarily
incarcerated. Rather, at most decision points, retention of the
accused was "virtually automatic."95
According to the Scheff study, explanations for the inade-
quacy of the psychiatric examinations as a screening device are
not hard to find. Interviews ranged in length from five min-
utes to seveteen minutes, with the mean time being 10.2 minutes.
The interviews were described as hurried, with the questions of
the examiners coming "so rapidly that the examiner often inter-
rupted the patient, or one examiner interrupted the other." '96 In
weighing the prospective patient's responses during the interview,
the physician appeared to the observer not to give the patient
credit for the large number of correct answers he gave. The ex-
aminers seemed to feel that a wrong answer established lack of
orientation, even when it was preceded by a series of correct an-
swers. On this basis the manner of examination was seen as at
times capricious. Thus one of the prospective patients, when
asked, "In what ways are a banana, an orange, and an apple alike?"
answered, "They are all something to eat." This answer was used
as part of the examiner's explanation for his recommendation to
commit. When asked for the grounds of this judgment, he stated
that the person's behavior had been "bizarre" (possibly referring
to her alleged promiscuity), her affect inappropriate ('When she
talked about being pregnant, it was without feeling,') and with
regard to the above question: 'She wasn't able to say a banana
and an orange were fruit. She couldn't take it one step further,
she had to say it was something to eat.'" It was thus suggested
that the woman's thinking manifested concreteness, although in
her other answers to classification questions, and to proverb inter-
pretations, concreteness was not apparent. In another case, the
physician stated that he thought the accused person was sus-
picious and distrustful, because he had asked about the possi-
bility of being represented by counsel at the judicial hearing. One
court-employed examiner spoke of having recommended a 30-
fine or release persons alleged to be mentally ill, they would rarely if ever take
the responsibility for releasing a mental patient without a medical recommenda-
tion to that effect. We take this factor as an indication of some of the limits
of judicial review of even apparently superficial medical judgments, in the ab-
sence of adversary proceedings including vigorous cross-examination. Scheff
concludes that under present procedures, the question which is "crucial, there-
fore, for the entire screening process is whether or not the court-appointed
psychiatric examiners presume illness." Id. at 139.
95. Id. at 135-38. For a criticism of the function and evidentiary value
of the application of judicial inquiry, see id. at 141-42.
96. Id. at 144.
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day observation for a person whom he had thought not to be
mentally ill, on the grounds that the person, a young man, could
not get along with his parents, and "might get into trouble." 7
This examiner continued:
We always take the conservative side (commitment or ob-
servation). Suppose a patient should commit suicide. We
always make the conservative decision. I had rather play it
safe. There's no harm in doing it that way.98
It appeared to the observer that "playing it safe" meant that
even in those cases where the examination established nothing,
the psychiatrists did not consider recommending release. In
one case, for instance, the examination had established that the
prospective patient had good memory, was oriented, and spoke
quietly and seriously. The observer offered this record of his
discussion with the physician after the examination:
When the doctor told me he was recommending commitment
for this patient too (he had also recommended commitment
in the two examinations held earlier that day) he laughed
because he could see what my next question was going to
be. He said, "I already recommended the release of two pa-
tients this month." This sounded like it was the maximum
the way he said it.09
Several additional statements in the Scheff study indicate
an element of prejudgment. 100 Among these, perhaps the most
striking was that of one physician who commented on cases in
which the prospective patient's family or other private parties ini-
tiated hospitalization. In such cases, recommendations for com-
mitment were generally automatic. The assumption seemed to be
that, if a patient's own family or friends want to get rid of him,
then surely something must be wrong with him. 101
What Scheff calls the "lack of cure" evident in these exami-
nations was indicated also on the forms on which the examiners
made their recommendations. On most of these forms sections
had been left unanswered and other sections were answered in a
"peremptory and uninformative" way. For example, to the ques-
tion "On what subject or in what way is derangement now mani-
fested?" one of the examiners employed regularly by one of the
committing courts always answered "Is mentally ill." Scheff
concludes:
97. Id. at 145-47.
98. Id. at 147.
99. Id. at 147-48.
100. Id. at 148-49.
101. Id. at 149. An alternative theory of the family situation is offered in
LAING, ESTERSON, & LEE, SANITY, MADNESS AND THE FAMILY (1971).
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The omissions, and the almost flippant brevity of these forms,
together with their arbitrariness, lack of evidence, and
prejudicial character of the examinations ... all support
the observer's conclusion that, except in very unusual cases,
the psychiatric examiner's recommendation to retain the pa-
tient is virtually automatic.10 2
The Scheff study indicates that various administrative con-
siderations also influence the results of examinations." 8 The
impact of financial considerations is reflected in the following
comment of one examiner concerning the brevity of his exami-
nations: "It's not remunerative. I'm taking a hell of a cut. I
can't spend 45 minutes with a patient. I don't have the time,
it doesn't pay."'0 4 In relating the financial factor to the results of
the examination as well as to its length, Scheff points out that if
they recommend retention, the examiners can avoid interrupting the
hospitalization and commitment procedures already in process,
while if they recommend release, they must build a case showing
why these procedures should be interrupted. Building such a
case would take much more time and, as Scheff observes, thereby
reduce the examiner's rate of pay. Apart from the financial ques-
tion, however, Scheff's analysis suggests a kind of bureaucratic
process which constitutes the procedure for commitment. This
process is inevitably attended by built-in amounts of inertia and
momentum, so that any single actor involved in the process has
a difficult time interrupting it.
On the basis of his analysis of these other factors involved in
commitment, such as the motivations of the examiners, the tend-
ency of the courts, and so on, Scheff concludes that the very ele-
ment which theoretically should provide the entire basis for the
proceedings, i.e., the mental condition of the person alleged to
be mentally ill, is not usually an important factor in determining
their outcome.
The marginal nature of the majority of the cases, the per-
emptoriness and inadequacy of most of the examinations, when
considered in light of the fact that virtually every patient is
recommended for commitment, would appear to demonstrate
this proposition. 105
Additional analysis and research material support Scheff's
conclusion. Thus, Dr. Bernard Diamond, in discussing court pro-
ceedings to determine sanity when the question has been raised
as part of a criminal defense, suggests:
102. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL, supra note 1, at 149.
103. For a presentation of the ideological and political factors suggested
by the Scheff study, see id. at 150-55.
104. Id. at 144.
105. Id. at 154.
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The selection of court-appointed psychiatrists is seldom made
from the random universe of the psychiatric population.
Certain psychiatrists tend to be appointed over and over
again. These are generally men who have an active inter-
est in forensic psychiatry. More often than not they tend to be
Kraepelinian and less dynamic in their approach to cases.
They are often drawn from the ranks of administrative psy-
chiatry, an area deficient in psychoanalytically oriented ther-
apists. They are less inclined to probe deeply, more inclined
to accept uncritically surface manifestations, and prone to in-
terpret the [criminal] legal criteria for sanity in a narrowly
restricted way.'01
Dr. Diamond's analysis and conclusions would seem to have analo-
gous application in cases of involuntary mental hospitalization by
nominally civil procedures.'11
Greater depth in the psychiairic examination cannot in itself
be counted upon to safeguard the defendant against improperly
continued incarceration in the absence of adversary criticism of
the resulting diagnosis. Dr. Diamond suggests that availability
of sufficient funds for an extensive clinical examination might re-
solve some of the problems of the abbreviated examinations.108
One of these problems is the lack of money for auxiliary exam-
inations, such as projective tests (for instance, the Rorschach or ink
blot test).10 9 However, even if additional money were available,
the deficiencies inherent in these testing procedures prevent them
from serving as an adequate safeguard from arbitrary commit-
ment. Dr. Szasz has criticized projective tests because of their
inherent unreliability and the role played by financial, adminis-
trative, and political factors in determining the results of the
tests. 110 Perhaps the best summary of the problems presented
by psychiatric examination of a person accused of mental illness
is his contention that "there is no behavior or person that a mod-
em psychiatrist cannot plausibly diagnose as abnormal or ill.""'
106. Diamond, supra note 88, at 148 (footnote omitted). For a critical
description of one Kraepelinian analysis, see LAING, THE POLITICS OF ExPERi-
ENCE, supra note 16, at 106-07.
107. Diamond, supra note 88, at 145-51. Law students doing legal aid work
at a Connecticut hospital reported that the same two physicians were employed
in all probate proceedings there, and received a uniform sum per examination.
Similar arrangements are described in the Scheff studies cited. See T. SCHEFF,
supra note 1, at 140. See also, T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 132-33 citing
Mechanic, Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, 46 MENTAL
HYGIENE 66 (Jan. 1962). See also T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 133 citing
Brown, Newer Dimensions in Patient Care Part I, at 60 (1961).
108. Diamond, supra note 88, at 150.
109. Id. at 147.
110. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 34-35.
111. Id. at 35. (citation omitted). Additional data are presented in SzAsz,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 1.
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Whether or not one accepts this view, the accumulated weight
of the available evidence indicates that it is unrealistic to ex-
pect the examining physician or the courts to perform their screen-
ing function effectively in the absence of active, adversary counsel
for the defense." 2
THE PUNITIVE NATURE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENT AND OF NOMINALLY
THERAPEUTIC TREATMENT
MODALITIES
It is frequently argued that formality in the commitment pro-
cess is antitherapeutic and that an adversary proceeding is inap-
propriate to involuntary mental hospitalization.1 3  However,
even emergency commitment has grave consequences for the per-
son subjected to such proceedings. Emergency commitment may
additionally lead to prolonged hospitalization. Therefore, some
consideration of the institutional setting which is faced by the in-
mates of mental hospitals is in order at this point.
Physicians understandably do not wish to be perceived
as jailors; the conception of institutional psychiatrists and other
hospital personnel as essentially prison guards is no doubt for-
eign to the self-perceptions of the employees of state mental hos-
pitals. A number of ex-inmates of such institutions have never-
theless characterized hospital employees in this way." 4 We by
no means consider that such a designation does justice to the
goals, attitudes, and work of state hospital employees. But such
a conceptualization can both highlight the existence of certain
conflicts of interest between inmates and staff, and allude indi-
rectly to the atmosphere and function of the mental hospital, which
may tend to become far more oppressive than either staff or in-
mates desire it to be.
112. The court in Lessard, supra note 91, held that a person detained on the
grounds of mental illness has a constitutional right to counsel and to appointed
counsel if the individual is indigent. The court found further that this require-
ment was not met by the appointment of a guardian ad litem who "happened to
be an attorney," as the guardian in question had not acted "as legal counsel for
the individual threatened with commitment." The detained person "must have
counsel at the preliminary hearing, with time before that to prepare any initial
defenses which are available." Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 at
1097-99. For a further indication of the inadequacy in practical terms of the
guardian ad litem arrangement, see T. SCHEFF, supra note 1, at 137-38.
113. For a summary of this argument see Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 2,
at 67.
114. See Statement of Mental Patients Resistance, Summer 1972, and Col-
letti, Jailers of the People, HEALTH RGiorrs NEWS, Dec. 1971 (both on file with
the Center for the Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient Status). For a
brief summary of the suspicions of some former and potential patient-inmates,
see KiT-ME, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT, xvii-xviii (1971).
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Involuntary mental hospitalization in effect, if not in intent
or by design, is analogous to imprisonment. As many state ap-
pellate courts have recognized, civil commitment entails a "mass-
ive constriction of freedom."' 15  For example, civil commitment
directly infringes on the freedoms of travel, association, and
free exercise of religion and marital privacy in ways that do not
differ from the infringements of criminal imprisonment. 116
Commitment, at both the long-term and emergency levels, in-
volves detailed control and restriction of the inmate's life.11 7
The institutional staff experiences great difficulty in attempt-
ing to create a humane environment within the institutional
context. In this regard some comparison of the nominal and real
functions which society assigns to mental institutions may go far
toward explaining the double-bind in which staff members find
themselves.
Even the most conscientious staff person may often be unable
to square his or her humane feelings for inmates with the demands
of the institutional situation. Many hospital settings place great
responsibility and authority on the shoulders of the staff while
providing resources abysmally inadequate to the tasks assigned to
them." 8 Professor Goffman describes the situation in these terms:
Many total institutions, most of the time, seem to function
merely as storage dumps for inmates, but . ..they usually
present themselves to the public as rational organizations
designed consciously, through and through, as effective ma-
chines for producing a few officially avowed and officially
approved ends . . . . [O]ne frequent official objective is the
reformation of inmates in the direction of some ideal stand-
ard. This contradiction, between what the institution
does and what its officials must say it does, forms the basic
context of the staff's daily activity." 9
Without intending to attribute all the debilitating effects of
hospitalization directly to staff intentions or actions, we note only
that the inmate's experience of the institutional setting may ac-
cord more with his image of imprisonment than with anything
one would ordinarily expect to find in a therapeutic environ-
115. See cases cited in Chambers, supra note 20, at 1157, n.218.
116. For some further analysis of the curtailments on freedom entailed in
civil commitment and a discussion of some of the relevant case law see Chambers,
supra note 20, at 1151-68.
117. See GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 38-43.
118. See, e.g., CIVIL LIBERTIES (American Civil Liberties Union, 22 E. 40th
St., N.Y., N.Y. 10016), Sept. 1972; PENDING FEDERAL RULING PROMISES HELP
FOR MENTAL PATIENTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1972, sec.
1, at 35.
119. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 74.
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ment. Furthermore, contrary to the impact hospitalization is
normally expected to have upon patients, involuntary mental hos-
pitalization may cause or exacerbate rather than alleviate the "ill-
ness" it is intended to cure. In this regard Dr. Stanley Yolles, former
Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, once remarked,
"Let the doctor beware, who does not realize the amount of
mental illness he helped either to cause or to itensify by institu-
tionalizing mental patients."'120 Even short-term hospitalization
may undermine the individual's capacity to perform in the out-
side world,' 2 ' and it is recognized that long-term hospitalization
may have ill effects which the mere alleviation of staff and resource
inadequacies cannot cure. 122
In addition to the effects of incarceration itself and of the
admissions procedures discussed earlier, the ongoing regimen of
daily therapy in one form or another appears to have as much in
common with a medieval chamber of horrors as with one's expec-
tation of a twentieth century medical establishment. Certainly the
analogy to a penal institution is not very strained. Dr. Thomas
Szasz has pointedly referred to "tortures called treatments" in a
critical comparison of the therapeutic state with the Inquisition:
Descriptions and explanations of human behavior and social
control are, most often than not, merely a papering over,
with a fresh, scientific-sounding vocabulary, of earlier religi-
ous descriptions and explanations. This is especially clear
. ..in the replacement of the theological concept of heresy
with the medical concept of mental illness, and of the relig-
ious sanctions of confinement in a dungeon or burning at the
stake with the psychiatric sanctions of confinement in a hos-
pital or tortures called treatments. 12'
There is no apparent limit to the type of environment which
can be characterized as "therapy." One inmate described the ex-
perience of electroshock therapy (ECT), for example, as follows:
They hit you with the first jolt, and you experience pain that
you would never believe possible. At the same moment, you
see what could be described as a flash of lightening. You can-
not breathe, and they apply oxygen. During all this, you are
in convulsions. This lasts only a few moments, but it seems
120. Chambers, supra note 20, at 1129, citing Yolles, Mental Health's Homeo-
static State: A New Territory, 7 INTL J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 328 (1969).
121. See GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 14-71, describing the immediate under-
mining of an individual's self-image that institutionalization entails.
122. See Chambers, supra note 20, at 1127, nn. 81-83 and sources therein
cited.
123. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 138. For a
survey of some of the more bizarre, though not necessarily rare, forms of "treat-
ment" accorded, coincidentally enough, to both prisoners and mental patients,
see Note, supra note 65.
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like a lifetime. A few seconds after that, the pain is so se-
vere that you pass out.12 4
The inventor of ECT himself has remarked: "When I saw the
patient's reaction, I thought to myself: This ought to be abol-
ished!' 125 Possible side effects of ECT include disorientation
in time and space, damaged muscles and brain tissue, broken
bones, and loss of memory and inhibitions. 120
Another form of treatment which has been administered to
mental patients is "rage reduction therapy," which consists of
physical attacks directed at passive-aggressive patients as treat-
ment for their condition. This "therapy" involves a range of at-
tacks from tickling to heavy physical blows. The administra-
tion of therapeutic beatings by psychiatrists applying rage reduc-
tion thereapy is reported to have caused the death of one pa-
tient and back injuries to another. 127  While such forms of treat-
ment may be among the more radical in the repertoire of psy-
chiatry, they serve to indicate the extent to which treatment
may go in the name of therapy.
Lobotomy now seems to be making a comeback as a treat-
ment modality of choice for a number of patients. 2  Despite
claimed inprovements in the technique of its administration, how-
ever, each type of lobotomy has the same general side effects, in-
cluding loss of memory, insight, affection and values. 29 Addi-
tional forms of treatment currently inflicted on inmates of men-
tal institutions include aversive conditioning and other forms of
behavior modification. Perhaps the most spectacular current use
124. Letter of Samantha D., June 13, 1972. For a chilling experiential
description of electroshock see Field, Terror on Tuesdays and Thursdays, THE
WHITE SHIRTS, 5-8 (published by the author, 1964; on file with the Center for
the Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient Status.)
It has been remarked that the number of law suits arising as a result of the
use of electroshock was in part responsible for the reduction in their number,
which is now roughly ten per month at Napa State Hospital from an average of
some fifty per month several years ago. Interview with A.S. Linn, M.D., Medi-
cal Program Consultant, at Napa State Hospital, Imola, California, June 1, 1972.
This interesting advance in treatment modality is indicative of the relation be-
tween medical science and social policy, troublesome as this relation may
sometimes be for institutional practitioners.
125. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS, supra note 1, at 31.
126. Note, supra note 65, at 632, n.91 citing FOUNDATIONS OF ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 562 (P. London and D. Rosenhan eds. 1968); A. NOYES & L.
KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 540-41 (6th ed. 1963).
127. THE ABOLrrIONIST 3 (Summer 1971) citing PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 2,
1970, at 4.
. 128. See Here Come the Lobotomists Again, MEDICAL WORLD NEWS, Jan.
15, 1971, at 35; Note, supra note 65, at 632-33; Roberts, Psychosurgery: The
Final Solution to the Woman Problem, ROUOH TIMES, Sept. 1972, at 16-17.
129. Note, supra note 65, at 633 citing A. NOYES & L. KOLB, MODERN
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 553 (6th ed. 1963).
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of aversion therapy is in the treatment of persons labelled homo-
sexual.
The patient has his or her genitalia hooked up to an electrical
apparatus and is shown homosexually oriented pornography
and given a shock. The patient . . . is then shown heter-
osexually oriented pornography and is given no shock.'8 0
In explaining the function of such therapy, one psychologist has
written:
The major value of aversion procedures is that they provide
a means of achieving control over injurious behavior for a
period of time during which alternative, and more reward-
ing, modes of response can be established and strengthened.
Used by itself, this method may bring about a temporary sup-
pression of deviant tendencies. 131
It has been suggested that this description indicates a concern on
the part of the behavior therapist not only with extinguishing cer-
tain behavior, but also with establishing a new, and more ac-
ceptable behavior. Thus, another author has concluded that
the behavioral therapist (or the state which directs his con-
duct) is not simply exercising an objective clinical choice.
Rather, he is making moral or social judgments by identi-
fying "unacceptable" behavior to extinguish and "accept-
able" behavior to establish.13 2
Indeed, as the author went on to remark, "the use of any psychi-
atric technique involves such moral or social choices.'1 3
Besides the possibility of subjection to one of these more
dramatic therapeutic modalities, the inmate faces a situation
within the instituion which permits the ongoing invention of
treatments to fit the behavior (or "punishments" to fit the
"crime"). A summary of some of the potential instruments of
reward and punishment available to staff is provided in the Goff-
man study:
The authority of the attendant in the operation of his con-
trol system is backed up by both positive and negative power.
This power is an essential element in his control of the ward.
He can give the patient privileges, and he can punish the
patient. The privileges consist of having the best job, bet-
ter rooms and beds, minor luxuries like coffee on the ward,
a little more privacy than the average patient, going outside
the ward without supervision, having more access than the
average patient to the attendant's companionship or to profes-
130. Florida Gays Protest Prison 'Treatment', RouGH TIMES, Dec. 1972, at 19.
131. Note, supra note 65, at 630 citing A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BE-
HAVIOR MODIFICATION 509 (1969).
132. Note, supra note 65, at 630-31.
133. Id. at 631.
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sional personnel like the physicians, and enjoying such in-
tangible but vital things as being treated with personal kind-
ness and respect.
The punishments which can be applied by the ward attend-
ant are suspension of all privileges, psychological mistreat-
ment, such as ridicule, vicious ribbing, moderate and some-
times severe corporal punishment, locking up the patient in
an isolated room, denial or distortion of access to the pro-
fessional personnel, threatening to put, or putting, the patient
on the list for electroshock therapy, transfer of the patient
to undesirable wards, and regular assignment of the patient
to unpleasant tasks such as cleaning up after the soilers.134
At some point, the forms of treatment which are rationalized
as therapy shade into abusive behavior which must be attributed to
sadism rather than to psychiatric or medical authority. 18 5 For ex-
ample, an ex-patient reports this event from his first night at one
institution:
On the night of my admission to the state asylum, I was
smoking a cigarette in the toilet when another inmate set off
a thunderous slamming of doors in the corridor and then
retreated to his room. Four uniformed screws rushed into the
toilet and accused me of making the racket. When I denied
it, one smashed me across the mouth with the back of his
hand. I protested and all four joined in-throttling me,
slugging me with their fists, knees and feet, dragging me along
the hall and lashing me to a bed under a canvas restraining
sheet.""6
It is difficult to determine the extent to which medical practition-
ers are silently involved in sanctioning such practices. It must be
noted that at least occasionally sadistic staff behavior is made pos-
sible, though not intentionally authorized, by the application of a
diagnostic label. Subsequent abuses thus trace back to the exer-
cise of medical authority, although not specifically attributable to
the examining physician. Such incidents would seem to be a na-
tural outgrowth of a situation in which one group of individuals
is given virtually absolute control over the lives of a second
group, in the context of a medical rationale which labels the
controlled group as mentally ill and therefore somehow inferior.
134. GOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
135. See, e.g., Shewbridge, Mental Patients Oppressed, THE CATHOLIC
WORKER, Sept. 1972, at 7. Ms. Shewbridge notes that
Writing under the pseudonym of Hannah Green, a former patient in
the nationally reputed Chestbut Lodge told of being tied in an ice pack
for five hours. The bindings were deliberately tied so as to prevent
blood circulation, causing excessive pain after a period of two hours.
The same writer recounts that another patient similarly restrained was
struck in the face while immobilized, for refusing her medication.
136. Brown, Memoirs of an Intermittent Madman, PLAYBOY, June 1972, at
174.
[Vol. 13
1973] EMERGENCY COMMITMENT STATUTES 439
The line between professional responsibility and random
unsanctioned abuse is difficult to draw. We have tried only to
indicate briefly some of the ways in which the rationale of mental
illness may justify what can only be characterized as at best bi-
zarre forms of treatment, and to indicate more generally the na-
ture of the institutional setting to which commitment consigns an
individual.
The example of drug therapy illustrates the connection be-
tween medical authority and the debasing process of institutional
treatment. Cases of abusive administration or indefinite unsu-
pervised prescription only serve to highlight the underlying prob-
lem. Patients are routinely drugged as part of their "treatment
program." Yet the fact that a drug produces an alteration of
consciousness and a modification of behavior does not justify its
administration as medicine. The present widespread use of drug
therapy is an attempt to control people rather than to treat some
underlying disease entity. The question of implementing social
control by such means is a question of social and political policy.
It should be approached and treated as such rather than as a med-
ical question, the answer to which may be grounded in the author-
ity of objective science.
In any event, the argument that emergency hospitalization is
a purely medical procedure is belied by the reality of the exis-
tence to which the accused person is immediately subjected and
to which he may be consigned indefinitely by subsequent proceed-
ings. As one author has commented:
To be taken without consent from my home and friends; to
lose my liberty; to undergo all those assaults on my personality
which modern psychotherapy knows how to deliver; to be re-
made after some pattern of "normality" hatched in a Vien-
nese laboratory to which I never professed allegiance;
to know that this process will never end until either my cap-
tors have succeeded or I have grown wise enough to cheat
them with apparent success-who cares whether this is
called Punishment or not?1
3 7
AN EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL
COMMITMENT
Emergency hospitalization or detention is a "temporary mea-
sure for the speedy processing of emergency situations."' 3 8 The
emergency statutes are said to "deal with the suppression and
137. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES JUI CATA 224,
227 (1953).
138. BRAKEL AND R. ROCK, supra note 79, at 41-42.
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prevention of conduct likely to create a 'clear and present danger'
to persons or property."' 39 Yet in only eight states is the criterion
for commitment limited to dangerousness to self or to the person
or property of others. 140  In addition, it is not apparent that any
criteria exist which might permit empirical determinations of the
likelihood of future dangerous conduct. It has been observed that
for commitment purposes generally,
[T]he statutes are so broadly worded that they fail to iden-
tify with clarity or precision the type and degree of mental
illness for which involuntary hospitalization, with the accom-
panying deprivation of many personal and civil rights,
is justified. . . . Even those statutes which rely on the con-
cept of dangerousness as a justification for hospitaliza-
tion are in significant aspects vague. In application, such
a standard can become as broad as the ingenuity of the person
who must apply it allows.' 4 '
As presently written, then, even the standard commitment stat-
utes are inextricably tied in with the concept of mental illness and
the faith that medical practitioners are qualified to determine the
existence of this "disease" objectively and thus authoritatively. It
appears that the criterion of dangerousness adds nothing to
the justifications for involuntary commitment. In commitment
proceedings the term is applied by doctors on the basis of medical
authority, which is no more capable of a valid prediction of dan-
gerousness than it is of defining "mental illness" by objective
standards. In this regard it has been observed:
Psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors [of danger]
-inaccurate in an absolute sense-and even less accur-
ate when compared to actuarial devices such as experience
and prediction tables. Even more significant for legal pur-
poses, it seems that psychiatrists are particularly prone to one
type of error-over-prediction. 42
While the very question of psychiatric prediction is related in
the first instance to psychiatric ability to diagnose mental illness as
the presumed source of potentially dangerous behavior, it also de-
pends upon a correlation between the notion of mental illness and
139. Id. at 42.
140. Arizona, for example, provides for commitment if the court finds a
person "mentally ill to such a degree that he is in danger of injuring himself or
the person or property of others ... ." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-514(Supp. 1972). Other statutes explicitly providing for commitment only on a
finding of mental illness in correlation with some form of "dangerousness" are:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-417 (1971); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-544 (Supp. 1971);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-201
(1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 433.685 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135:19(1964); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.02.010 (1962).
141. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted).
142. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment, PSYCHOL-
ooY ToDAY, Feb. 1969, at 47.
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the existence of violent behavior. No such correlation has in fact
been shown. Regarding dangerousness to self, for example, it
has been pointed out that approximately 70 per cent of all sui-
cides are committed by people who are not identifiably mentally
ill.143  As for the relationship between mental illness and violent
behavior, it has been shown that
[v]ariations in the rates of psychiatric institutionalization,
variations in the levels of care and treatment in public institu-
tions, and variations in the rates of murder, nonnegligent
manslaughter, and suicide do not appear to be related. This
is significant in that many laymen frequently seem to er-
roneously view the institutionalized mentally ill as almost
universally homicidal or suicidal. The figures do not sup-
port this position. Whether the mentally ill are allowed to
remain in the community or whether they are insitutionalized
would seem to have no significant effect on the overall rate of
violent crime or suicide.1
4 4
It must be noted further that
[f]or the typically aberrant individual . . the matter of
prediction is not susceptible of answer. However nervous a
full-blown paranoiac may make us, there are no actuarial
data indicating that he is more likely to commit a crime than
any normal person. . . . [O]n a predictive basis we have,
as yet, nothing to rely on.'
45
143. CLINARD, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 425 (1957). See also DURK-
HEIM, SUICIDE 66-67 (1957). See generally sources cited in Ennis, supra note
22, at 108, n.24.
144. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEORGETOWN L.J. 752, 767
(1969). Regarding the basic policy questions beneath this factual dispute as
to the probabilities of suicide, a persuasively argued piece against the use of
the parens patriae power to prevent suicide is Comment, Society's Right to
Protect an Individual Against Himself, 2 CONN. L. REV. 150 (1969).
145. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 82 (1968). See also Chambers, supra note 20,
at 1124, n.66 citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 321 (1970)
(statement of Dr. Sherman Keiffer, Director, National Center for Mental Health
Services, Training, and Research, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.):
"A number of studies conducted or supported by the [National Institute of
Mental Health] have demonstrated that an extremely small percentage of civilly
committed patients meet the statutory standard of danger to themselves or others
to an extent that . . . necessitates inpatient care."
A conclusion somewhat to the contrary is reported in Rappeport and
Lassen, Dangerousness: Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients and
the General Population, READINGS, supra note 79, at 221: "We . . . do not find
any clear-cut indications that the mentally ill are to any great extent less in-
volved in criminal behavior than those in the general community. Instead ...
for some offenses such as robbery and also probably rape, our patients were
more frequently arrested than the general population." Even this report, how-
ever, found "no significant difference in the arrest rate experiences of our two
populations." Compare Chambers, supra at 1124: "Indeed, as a group, persons
labelled mentally ill may be less likely to engage in aggressive misconduct
than the rest of the community who are considered sane."
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It should be kept in mind that even a statistical indication that
a certain percentage of the members of a given group may or will
engage in some particular form of behavior such as violence,
does not provide any indicator of future behavior for any partic-
ular member of that group. The application of probabilities to
particular cases involving an insight into the individuals involved
would be the task of psychiatry, if this task could be performed
at all. However, accurate prediction in an individual case cannot
be grounded in a percentage applicable only to group behavior.
In view of their inherent unreliability, the commitment stand-
ards as they are presently structured may be subject to attack as
authorizing criminal sanctions on the basis of a standard which is
unconstitutionally vague. Thus, in Lanzetta v. New Jersey146
the Supreme Court of the United States held that an offense
entailing criminal sanctions must be adequately defined so that
those who are subject to it may be informed as to what the state
commands or forbids. The statute struck down in Lanzetta at-
tempted to make being "a gangster" a criminal offense. Applying
the ruling to the emergency commitment context would require
some development of the analogies between being declared a
mentally ill person and being declared a gangster. Comparison
might be drawn between the consequences of the respective la-
bels-incarceration, 4 7 stigmatization, and the institutional setting
to which application of the lable subjects the designated person.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson v. California,4 '
expressed his belief that the designation of a person as a "crim-
inal" was an important distinction between criminal convictions
and therapeutic judgments, stating that "[w]hile afflicted people
may be confined either for treatment or for the protection of so-
ciety, they are not branded as criminals."' 49  On the other hand
Judge Howard Zieman, speaking before the California State
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, noted that the public is so wary
of mental illness that it is easier for an ex-convict to find em-
ployment than for a former mental patient.150 Mr. Bruce Ennis,
146. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
147. A report on Lessard v. Schmidt comments that "In actions for involun-
tary commitment, the interest involved is the loss of freedom through invol-
untary incarceration." 2 Pov. L. REP. 16, 255, at 16, 720 (1972). The
Lessard court noted that a person hospitalized for mental illness loses many
civil rights, such as the right to contract, marry and to vote, and that in some
respects, such as the loss of a driver's license, "the civil deprivations which
follow civil commitment are more serious than the deprivations which accom-
pany a criminal conviction." Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
148. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
149. Id. at 668-69.
150. L.A. Times, July 11, 1962, sec. 1, at 26, col. 1.
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Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union and for several
years an advocate in civil commitment cases has written that "So-
ciety's fear of the mentally ill is so great that any commitment
to a mental hospital, no matter how informal, creates a terrible
stigma. Hospitalization, even voluntary hospitalization, is an al-
most absolute bar to public employment."'' In Lessard v. Schmidt,
a Wisconsin federal district court also declared that the prob-
lems that follow a person committed for mental illness after re-
lease from the hospital can be greater than those following a re-
leased felon:
Perhaps the most serious possible effect of a decision to com-
mit an individual lies in the statistics which indicate that an
individual committed to a mental institution has a much
greater chance of dying than if he were left at large.15 2
The analogy between hospitalization and imprisonment may
also provide a basis upon which to apply the Supreme Court's
holding in In re Gault,"" which may be argued as forbidding the
relaxation of criminal procedural safeguards in cases of involun-
tary emergency and long-term commitment. The Court in Gault
described the consequences of consignment to a juvenile home and
concluded that the reality of such confinement effectively under-
cut any rationale for procedural laxity based upon the nominally
benign purpose of the proceedings. 54 The Lessard court, re-
jecting the contention that less stringent procedural safeguards
may be employed in commitment proceedings because such pro-
ceedings are civil rather than criminal, concluded that "that ar-
gument should have been laid to rest after the decision of the Su-
preme Court in In re Gault."'55
Gault and related cases may also indicate that given the ac-
tual facts concerning the type of incarceration mental patients suf-
fer and the possibility of indefinite confinement following emer-
gency commitment, suspension of procedural safeguards in com-
mitment proceedings is constitutionally impermissible. Again,
the Lessard court concluded that "[s]trict adherence to stringent
procedural requirements and narrow, precise standards were
necessary in involuntary commitment actions."' 6
Based on our analysis of psychiatry as unscientific and men-
151. Ennis, supra note 22, at 110 (footnotes omitted).
152. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
153. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. Id. at 27-28.
155. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See
also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) and Denton v. Common-
wealth, 383 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1964).
156. Lessard v. Schmidt, 2 Pov. L. REP. 16, 255, at 16, 720 (1972).
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tal illness as an arbitrary concept, we would favor the abolition
of involuntary mental hospitalization. Involuntary commitment
of those considered dangerous should be based on specific vio-
lations of the criminal law. However, assuming arguendo the
continued acceptance in our society of the concept of mental ill-
ness, it should nevertheless be possible to devise a system of deten-
tion which is not based on inherently vague criteria. In addition,
there is no demonstrable need for the suspension of ordinary pro-
cedural safeguards and the immediate imposition of an invol-
untary treatment program which may effectively and forever pre-
judice the prospect of a fair hearing. While the question of spe-
cific standards which would justify involuntary commitment is
problematic, it may be possible for legislatures to devise a
standard of "specific past acts." Under this standard, the "men-
tally ill" could be involuntarily confined only when found guilty
of certain threatening or injurious acts. Under such a system, it
might in practice be impossible to eliminate some dependence on
the medical profession for differentiating persons accused of men-
tal illness from criminal defendants; however, the determination
of which of the mentally ill could be involuntarily confined and
treated would depend on a legislatively established standard to be
applied by a judge or jury.
Assuming the existence of a "specific past acts" standard or
some more general nonmedical standard of dangerousness, what
safeguards should an emergency commitment statute properly in-
clude? To make the availability of procedural safeguards
meaningful, a person would have to be found guilty by a judge
or jury prior to any involuntary hospitalization. The Indiana provi-
sion for the emergency commitment of "dangerous" or "violent"
persons provides some basis for considering the prospect of im-
mediate hearings in emergency commitment cases. 157  Allegedly
dangerous persons are served with a warrant and brought before a
judge for immediate examination. If the examiner finds that the
person is dangerous, he may issue an order for incarceration in
a jail "or suitable place of detention." Allegedly "violent"
persons are also given an immediate hearing if the person, "unless
restrained, will cause injury to his family or other persons." An
immediate hearing would be desirable if the accused requests it,
and should therefore be available upon his request. Whether an
immediate hearing is required or optional, a hearing should also
be available within 24 hours of apprehension if desired by the
accused. Presently a judicial order must be obtained within 48
hours in South Carolina and within 24 hours in Texas after a per-
157. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1222 (1964).
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son accused of mental illness has been taken into protective cus-
tody by a public officer. 158 At least the option of an early hear-
ing is advisable to minimize the effects of detention and prevent
the emergency commitment order from fulfilling its own predic-
tion due to the unsettling consequences of admission to the med-
ical detention facility.
As a second approach to the problem of prejudicial early
treatment it would seem appropriate to authorize temporary de-
tention in a jail, or better still, in a separate but nonmedical de-
tention facility, which would serve to put the person on notice
that he was about to be involved in an adversary proceeding in
which his liberty would be at stake. Medical examinations could
be made available to insure that there is not some physiological or
ordinary medical cause for the accused person's behavior. This
approach seems prefereable, from a civil liberties perspective, to
temporary detention and treatment in a mental institution. Such an
approach would avoid early subjection to chemical tranquillization
which may improve "manageability" at the expense of a person's
right to a fair hearing. Any hearing should also require that the
accused person have the right to be present and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The Lessard court held that an indi-
vidual's right to be heard at his commitment hearing could be
prejudicial because of incapacity caused by medication or lack of
counsel. 59 If medication may prejudice a person's ability to be
heard, certainly his absence from the hearing will have a similar
effect. The accused should have the option of attending his own
hearing. Arguments to the contrary concerning the traumatic ef-
fect of the hearing simply are not persuasive against the realities
of hospitalization, which surely are as traumatic as the hearing it-
self. In addition, the accused person should have an absolute
right to refuse medication prior to trial or minimally, the trier of
fact should be informed of the nature of medication employed and
its typical side effects.
CONCLUSION
We urge the abolition of involuntary mental hospitaliza-
tion in any form-long-term or emergency. Involuntary commit-
ment as it is presently structured depends on a medical screening
process which is arbitrary and subjective while being rationalized
as scientific and objective. Emergency medical commitment is
particularly susceptible to this criticism in that it provides for con-
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-957 (Supp. 1972); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5547-27 (Supp. 1972).
159. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-92 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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finement on the basis of medical authority prior to the availabil-
ity of procedural safeguards. Such emergency commitment, be-
cause of the effects of treatment and the subjective factors influ-
encing diagnosis during the period of temporary detention, may
have the result of fulfilling its own prediction that an individual is
mentally ill. In the absence of total abolition of involuntary
commitment of the "mentally ill," legislators should strive to de-
velop more specific standards upon which to base a judgment of
commitment, and courts should require stringent procedural safe-
guards in order to protect the constitutional rights of those ac-
cused of mental illness.
